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THE BATTLE MAY BE OVER, BUT WHAT ABOUT THE WAR?
EXAMINING THE ESA IN THE CRUSADE AGAINST GLOBAL
WARMING AFTER IN RE POLAR BEAR ENDANGERED SPECIES
ACT LISTING AND SECTION 4(D) RULE LITIGATION
"The ESA is not some mystical expression of legislative
wonder at the miracle of life; nor is it an economic apoca-
lypse. The ESA tries to do something mankind has not
tried before: save other species and allow them to exist for
their own benefit regardless of their value to humanity. It
attempts great things; sometimes with success, usually with
failure."'
I. INTRODUCTION
The controversy surrounding global warming has undoubtedly
shifted during the last decade, and, as a result, the conversation no
longer centers on whether humans are causing palpable impacts on
the environment through global warming.2 Rather, the question
now is: What can be done about it?5 One measurable effect of
global climate change is seen in the polar bear's steadily dwindling
population, as a record eight out of nineteen polar bear subpopula-
tions are now in decline.4 Polar bears are "ice-obligate" in that they
1. Ray Vaughan, Proof of 'Prohibited Takings' Under the Endangered Species Act, 27
AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3D 421, § 1 (1994) (describing ESA's pros and cons).
2. See Is Global Warming Real?, NAT'L GEOGRAPHIC, http://environment.nation-
algeographic.com/environment/global-warming/gw-real/ (last visited Oct. 15,
2013) (discussing global climate change's reality and shift in controversy); see also
Climate Change Impacts and Adapting to Change, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://epa.
gov/climatechange/impacts-adaptation/ (last updated Sept. 9, 2013) (describing
areas impacted by global climate change); Climate Change Science Overview, ENvrL.
PROT. AGENCY, http://epa.gov/climatechange/science/overview.html (last up-
dated Sept. 9, 2013) (stressing recent climate change cannot be explained by natu-
ral causes alone).
3. See America's Climate Choices, NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL (2011), available at
http://dels.nas.edu/Report/America-Climate-Choices-2011/12781 (detailing rea-
sons for immediate action to combat global warming). The National Research
Council noted, "[A]s scientific knowledge has grown, this debate [about global
warming] is moving away from whether humans are causing warming and toward
questions of how best to respond." Id.; see also Maggie Kuhn, Climate Change and the
Polar Bear: Is the Endangered Species Act Up to the Task?, 27 ALASKA L. REv. 125, 126
(2010) (describing shift in conversation on global warming).
4. See Polar Bear Status Report, POLAR BEARS INT'L, http://www.polarbearsinter-
national.org/science/polar-bear-status-report (last visited Oct. 15, 2013) (describ-
ing statistical reports on polar bear's nineteen subpopulations). As a note, the
polar bear's subpopulations are distinguishable from the ESA's distinct population
(529)
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depend entirely on Arctic sea ice for species survival; specifically,
polar bears have evolved to rely on sea ice for hunting, feeding,
seasonal migration, denning, and breeding.5 Some experts predict
that by mid-century the Arctic Ocean will be almost completely free
of sea ice during the summer season, with some predicting this may
occur as soon as the year 2020.6 Consequently, reports estimate
that the polar bear may be wholly extinct by the end of this century,
and more than two-thirds of the world's polar bear population will
be lost by the year 2050.7
In light of these estimations, a multitude of individuals and in-
terest groups have engaged in a lengthy litigation process that
hinges on the polar bear's listing as a "threatened species" under
the Endangered Species Act (ESA or Act), primarily in the District
of Columbia Circuit case of In re Polar Bear Endangered Species Act
Listing and Section 4(d) Rule Litigation (In re Polar Bear V) .8 The polar
segments and are not to be equated. See In re Polar Bear Endangered Species Act
Listing and Section 4(d) Rule Litigation (In re Polar Bear V), 709 F.3d 1, 6 (D.C.
Cir. 2013) (clarifying potential confusion as to language of the polar bear sub-
populations). According to the International Union for Conservation of Nature
Polar Bear Specialist Group, eight polar bear subpopulations are now in decline,
three are stable, and one is increasing, compared to 2005 when five were declin-
ing, five were stable, and two were increasing. Id. There is no dispute as to the
data's insufficiency with regard to the status of the remaining seven subpopula-
tions of polar bears. Id.; see also CTR. FOR BIOLOGICAL DIvERsny, ON THIN ICE 2
(2013), available at http://www.biologicaldiversity.org/species/mammals/polar
bear/pdfs/OnThinIce.pdf (outlining polar bear's status five years after ESA list-
ing); Scott L. Schliebe, What Has Been Happening to Polar Bears in Recent Years?,
NAT'L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., http://www.arctic.noaa.gov/essay-
schliebe.html (last visited Oct. 18, 2013) (noting polar bear and ice seal popula-
tions may gauge climate change's impact).
5. See CONVENTION ON INT'L TRADE IN ENDANGERED SPECIES OF WILD FAUNA
AND FLORA, CONSIDERATION OF PROPOSALS FOR AMENDMENT OF APPENDICES I AND II
2 (2013) [hereinafter CITES], available at http://www.cites.org/sites/default/
files/eng/cop/16/prop/E-CoP6-Prop-03.pdf (last visited Oct. 18, 2013) (describ-
ing polar bear's dependency on sea ice). At the March 2013 CITES meeting in
Bangkok, Thailand, the United States was listed as the proponent for a suggested
amendment to transfer the polar bear species from Appendix II to Appendix I
under CITES. Id.; see also CTR. FOR BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY, PETITION To LIST POLAR
BEAR AS A THREATENED SPECIES iv (Feb. 16, 2005), available at http://www.biologi-
caldiversity.org/species/mammals/polar-bear/pdfs/ 15976_7338.pdf (describing
polar bear's reliance on sea ice).
6. CTR. FOR ICE, CLIMATE AND ECOSYSTEMS, NORWEGIAN POLAR INST., MELTING
SNOW AND ICE: A CALL FOR ACTION 10 (2009), available at http://www.regjeringen.
no/upload/UD/Vedlegg/klima/melting-ice-report.pdf (describing Arctic sea ice
loss predictions); see also ON THIN ICE, supra note 4, at 2 (observing predicted Arc-
tic sea ice loss timeline); Schliebe, supra note 4 (describing sea ice loss
predictions).
7. ON THIN ICE, supra note 4, at 2 (observing one predicted timeline for polar
bear species loss).
8. In re Polar Bear V, 709 F.3d at 2 (debating listing polar bear as "threatened
species" under ESA); see also In re Polar Bear Endangered Species Act Listing and
2
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bear has become known as an "international icon" for the war on
global climate change, in part because discussion surrounding the
ESA listing highlights the polar bear's dissipating Arctic habitat.9
In addition, the polar bear's listing has become the most controver-
sial ESA listing in the Act's forty-year history.' 0
While global climate change's effects may be bearable to
humans for the time being, the same cannot be said for the imme-
diate and substantial effects climate change is having on polar bear
habitats.'I The unique circumstances surrounding the polar bear's
Section 4(d) Rule Litigation (In re Polar Bear II), 748 F. Supp. 2d 19, 30 (D.D.C.
2010) (holding polar bear not in "imminent danger" qualified as endangered
under ESA), remanded to In re Polar Bear Endangered Species Act Listing and Sec-
tion 4(d) Rule Litigation (In re Polar Bear III), 794 F. Supp. 2d 65, 68 (D.D.C.
2011), affd, In rePolarBear V, 709 F.3d at 2, rehearing en banc denied (Apr. 29, 2013),
cert. denied, 2013 WL 3948014 (Oct. 07, 2013).
9. See Jeffrey W. Leppo, Litigating Against Government Agencies: Case Studies in
Challenges to Agency Decisions Under Federal Environmental Statutes, 43 ENvrL. L. REP.
NEWS & ANALYSis 10575, 10577 (2013) (describing polar bear as "international
icon" for global warming debate); see also For Students, PoLAR BEARS INT'L, http://
www.polarbearsinternational.org/for-students (last visited Oct. 21, 2013) (appeal-
ing to youth about polar bears). To capture a younger audience, the author asks,
"Who doesn't love polar bears? They're white and furry. Beautiful and powerful.
Plus they're cool! They also need your help." For Students, supra.
10. See Brendan R. Cummings & Kassie R. Siegel, Ursus Maritimus: Polar Bears
on Thin Ice, 22 NAT. RES. & ENV'T 3, 3-4 (2007) (describing attention garnered by
listing "high-profile species"). Cummings and Siegel noted:
The announcement of the proposed listing rule triggered a whirlwind of
media attention, resulting in more than 250 television stories, 1,000 print
stories, and 240 editorials. The continuing media frenzy associated with
listing proposal has cemented the polar bear as the iconic example of the
devastating impacts of global warming on the Earth's biodiversity. By the
time the official comment period on the proposed listing rule closed in
April 2007, over half a million comments had been submitted to FWS
urging protection of the species, the most ever for any rulemaking under
the ESA.
Id.; see also Brief of Defendants-Appellees, In re Polar Bear V, 709 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir.
2013) (Nos. 11-5219, 11-5221, 11-5222, 11-5223), 2012 WL 2394425, at *1, *9
(describing FWS receiving approximately 670,000 comments during public com-
ment period).
11. See In re Polar Bear V, 709 F.3d at 6 (quoting Determination of Threatened
Status for the Polar Bear (Ursus maritimus) Throughout Its Range, 73 Fed. Reg.
28,212, 28,292-293 (May 15, 2008) [hereinafter Listing Rule] (detailing effects on
polar bear species as basis of listing determination)). Specifically, the Listing Rule
stated that:
Productivity, abundance, and availability of ice seals, the polar bear's pri-
mary prey base, would be diminished by the projected loss of sea ice, and
energetic requirements of polar bears for movement and obtaining food
would increase. Access to traditional denning areas would be affected.
In turn, these factors would cause declines in the condition of polar bears
from nutritional stress and reduced productivity. As already evidenced
in . . . populations, polar bears would experience reductions in survival
and recruitment rates. The eventual effect is that polar bear populations
would decline. The rate and magnitude of decline would vary among
3
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predicament include the fact that global warming has affected the
Arctic more than any other area on earth.12 Additionally, the ESA's
framework for critical habitat and threatened species designations
has created a perfect storm for litigation.' 3 In re Polar Bear Vreveals
a remarkable overlap between animal rights and environmental
law.14 This litigation demonstrates interested citizens' attempts to
tackle global warming through ESA litigation and regulatory pro-
tections, the unyielding power of private and political interests, and
the ESA's ineffectiveness as a solution to the global warming
problem.' 5
This Note examines the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia's analysis in In re Polar Bear V' 6 Part II of this Note sum-
marizes In re Polar Bear Vs facts, including its procedural posture.1 7
Part III provides the legal background that informed the issues in
this case.' 8 Part IV of this Note reviews the D.C. Circuit's legal anal-
populations based on differences in the rate, timing, and magnitude of
impacts. However, within the foreseeable future, all populations would
be affected, and the species is likely to become in danger of extinction
throughout all of its range due to declining sea ice habitat.
Id.; see also ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, CLIMATE CHANGE INDICATORS IN THE UNITED
STATES, 2012 48 (2012), available at http://epa.gov/climatechange/pdfs/cli-
mateindicators-full-2012.pdf (comparing simultaneous threat to polar bear and
opening for commercial opportunities resulting from sea ice loss). For an in-
depth discussion on the causation between sea ice loss and the specific affects to
Arctic and subarctic marine mammals in addition to the polar bear, see Kristin L.
Laidre et al., Quantifying the Sensitivity of Arctic Marine Mammals to Climate-Induced
Habitat Change, ECOLOGICAL APPLICATIONS S97 (2008), available at http://www.po-
larbearsinternational.org/sites/default/files/laidreet-al._arcticmarmam-and
climate_2008.pdf (analyzing polar bear's response to climate change).
12. See Sarah Jane Morath, The Endangered Species Act: A New Avenue for Climate
Change Litigation , 29 PUB. LAND & RES. L. REv 23, 27-28 (2008) (discussing ESA's
aspects that make it "appealing litigation" tool for climate change).
13. CLIMATE CHANGE INDICATORS, supra note 11, at 48 (detailing sectors af-
fected by global climate change); see Sam Welch, The Scared Bear: Imminence, Climate
Change, and the Endangered Species Act, 39 ECOLOGY L.Q. 675, 675-76 (2012)
(describing unique circumstances surrounding polar bear's plight); Ben Jesup,
Endless War or End This War? The History of Litigation Under Section 4 of the Endangered
Species Act and Multi-District Litigation Settlements, 2012 No. 2 RMMLF-INST PAPER
NO. 7A, *7A-2 *7A-3, (Apr. 2012) (describing litigation). As Welch noted, the
Arctic region is "particularly vulnerable, and is already experiencing surface air
temperature increases twice that of the global average." Welch, supra, at 677.
14. See In re Polar Bear V, 709 F.3d at 2 (discussing case background).
15. Cummings & Siegel, supra note 10, at 4 (describing polar bear's unique
plight).
16. For a narrative analysis of In re Polar Bear V, see infra notes 170-210 and
accompanying text.
17. For further discussion of the facts of In re Polar Bear V see infra notes 22-60
and accompanying text.
18. For further discussion of the regulatory background informing In re Polar
Bear V, see infra notes 61-169 and accompanying text.
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ysis in In re Polar Bear V19 Next, Part V analyzes the court's reason-
ing, specifically addressing whether the court's analysis was in line
with precedent.20 Finally, Part VI concludes by discussing In re Polar
Bear Vs impact, including the status of polar bear populations in
the wake of the ESA listing, as well as the effect, or lack thereof, that
the decision will have on climate change litigation.21
II. FACTS
On February 16, 2005, the Center for Biological Diversity
(CBD) petitioned the Secretary of the Interior and the United
States Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) to list the polar bear as a
protected species under the ESA.22 The petition was made in light
of the growing concern that global climate change was threatening
the species and its habitat.23 On December 21, 2006, after peer
review and opportunities for public comment, the FWS published a
262-page "Status Review" pursuant to the ESA's Section 4(b) (3).24
After a three-year research period, the FWS issued a detailed find-
ing concluding that the polar bear was likely to become an endan-
gered species and face the threat of extinction within the
foreseeable future as a result of global climate change.25 In es-
sence, the FWS' Listing Rule, created as a result of the FWS' find-
ings, can be summarized in a "three-part thesis": (1) "the polar bear
is dependent on sea ice for its survival;" (2) "sea ice is declining;"
and (3) "climatic changes have and will continue to dramatically
19. For further discussion of the legal issues surrounding In re Polar Bear V, see
infra notes 170-210 and accompanying text.
20. For a critical analysis of the D.C. Circuit's reasoning, see infra notes 211-
254 and accompanying text.
21. For further discussion of In re Polar Bear Vs impact, see infra notes 255-275
and accompanying text.
22. PETITION To LIsT, supra note 5, at 3-4 (outlining CBD's petitioning of
FWS).
23. See id. (describing motivation behind petition); see also Saving the Polar
Bear, CTR. FOR BIOLOGIcAL DrVERSiny, http://www.biologicaldiversity.org/species/
mammals/polar.bear/ (last visited Oct. 18, 2013) (describing organizational mis-
sion to petition and save polar bear under ESA).
24. In re Polar Bear V, 709 F.3d 1, 4 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (describing length of
FWS' findings). On January 9 2007, the FWS published a proposed rule to list the
species as threatened, which triggered the 90-day public comment period. Id.
25. In re Polar Bear III, 794 F. Supp. 2d 65, 68-69 (D.D.C. 2011) (detailing
FWS' extensive research process). The court pointed out that the FWS considered
"over 160,000 pages of documents and approximately 670,000 comment submis-
sions from state and federal agencies, foreign governments, Alaska Native Tribes
and tribal organizations, federal commissions, local governments, commercial and
trade organizations, conservation organizations, nongovernmental organizations,
and private citizens." Id.
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reduce the extent and quality of Arctic sea ice to a degree suffi-
ciently grave to jeopardize polar bear populations." 2 6
On May 15, 2008, the FWS issued its Final Listing Rule that
listed the polar bear as a "threatened species" under the ESA.2 7
Concurrently, however, the agency published a Special Rule for the
polar bear pursuant to the ESA's Section 4(d) that became effective
immediately as the Interim Final Special Rule.2 8 On December 16,
2008, the Final Special Rule was codified, and made effective as of
January 15, 2009.29 With regard to the loss of sea ice habitat due to
greenhouse gas emissions, the agency reached the conclusion that
no additional ESA protections were warranted, nor would the full
extent of protections be offered under the ESA because the protec-
tions would not alleviate global climate change's threat.30 On May
14, 2008, a policy memorandum was issued clarifying that "the fu-
ture indirect impacts of individual [greenhouse gas] emitters can-
not be shown to result in 'take' based on the best available science
at this time," emphasizing that listing the polar bear would not lead
to the regulation of greenhouse gas emissions.3'
By listing the polar bear as a threatened species and issuing the
accompanying Special Rule, the FWS instigated an onslaught of liti-
26. In re Polar Bear V, 709 F.3d at 5-6 (quoting Listing Rule, supra note 11, at
28,212, 28,214, 28,244) (discussing FWS' Listing Rule).
27. Id. at 2 (noting FWS listed polar bear as "threatened species").
28. In re Polar Bear Endangered Species Act Listing and § 4(D) Rule Litiga-
tion (In re Polar Bear IV), 818 F. Supp. 2d 214, 222 (D.D.C. 2011) (citing Special Rule
for the Polar Bear, Interim Final Rule, 73 Fed. Reg. 28,306 (May 15, 2008)).
29. See Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Special Rule for the
Polar Bear, 73 Fed. Reg. 76,249 (Dec. 16, 2008) (codifying Final Special Rule).
30. In re Polar Bear IV, 818 F. Supp. 2d at 224, 231 (D.D.C. 2011) (describing
FWS' decision not to extend ESA protections).
31. Id. at 224 (quoting FWS policy memorandum); see also Press Release, U.S.
Dep't of the Interior, Secretary Kernpthorne Announces Decision to Protect Polar
Bears under Endangered Species Act (May 14, 2008), available at http://www.doi.
gov/news/archive/08 NewsReleases/080514a.html (describing limited scope of
polar bear's listing). As Secretary Kempthorne clarified:
While the legal standards under the ESA compel me to list the polar bear
as threatened, I want to make clear that this listing will not stop global
climate change or prevent any sea ice from melting. Any real solution
requires action by all major economies for it to be effective. That is why I
am taking administrative and regulatory action to make certain the ESA
isn't abused to make global warming policies.
Id.
6
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gation from numerous parties.32 In one case, In re Polar Bear IV,"
plaintiffs challenged the Special Rule, arguing it violated the ESA
by reducing the protections afforded to the polar bear "without
demonstrating a valid conservation basis for not applying the de-
fault rule."34 Conversely, another action, In re Polar Bear ,' was
filed by "big game hunting groups" against the FWS' listing deci-
sion, alleging the polar bear's classification as a threatened species
violated the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) because it "cre-
ated a ban on the import of sport-hunted polar bear trophies other-
wise legal under the Marine Mammal Protection Act" (MMPA).36
The FWS and the Secretary of the Interior (collectively, FWS) re-
sponded by moving for judgment on the pleadings on the basis that
(1) the plaintiffs failed to state a claim upon which relief could be
granted because they did not challenge a "final agency action,"
which is required for judicial review under the APA, and alterna-
tively (2) the plaintiffs lacked standing to bring the action.37 The
32. In re Polar Bear II, 748 F. Supp. 2d 19, 20-21 (D.D.C. 2010) (outlining
separate actions filed by parties in response to Listing Rule). In In re Polar Bear II,
the issues raised in the initial proceedings were: "(1) challenges to the polar bear
listing decision, (2) challenges to the polar bear §4(d) rule, and (3) challenges to
the sport-hunted polar bear trophy import ban." Leppo, supra note 9, at 10578.
33. 818 F. Supp. 2d 214 (D.D.C. 2011).
34. Id. at 229 (describing plaintiffs' challenges to Special Rule). The District
Court for the District of Columbia rejected the plaintiffs' argument that the Spe-
cial Rule was not "necessary and advisable to provide for the conservation of the
polar bear because it does not address the primary threat to the species from
greenhouse gas emissions and the loss of its sea ice habitat." Id. The court ob-
served that the Special Rule did not "expressly exempt[ ] greenhouse gas emis-
sions from regulation under the ESA or any other statute," rather it simply
mentioned greenhouse gases in the preamble. Id. at 231. The court went on to
support the FWS' conclusion in light of the administrative record demonstrating
ample support that there was "no way to determine how the emissions from a spe-
cific action both influence climate change and then subsequently affect specific
listed species, including polar bears." Id. (citation omitted). Denying the plain-
tiffs' motion for summary judgment against the FWS in part, the court observed:
The question at the heart of this litigation - whether the ESA is an effec-
tive or appropriate tool to address the threat of climate change - is not a
question that this Court can decide based upon its own independent as-
sessment, particularly in the abstract. The answer to that question will
ultimately be grounded in science and policy determinations that are be-
yond the purview of this Court.
Id. at 234.
35. 627 F. Supp. 2d 16 (D.D.C. 2009).
36. Id. at 18-19 (identifying big game hunting groups bringing APA claim
against FWS for creating ban on import of sport-hunted bear trophies otherwise
legal under MMPA).
37. See id. at 18-19 (analyzing grounds for moving for judgment on plead-
ings); see also In re Polar Bear III, 794 F. Supp. 2d 65, 78 n.17 (D.D.C. 2011)
(describing 4(d) Rule). The In re Polar Bear III court did not address challenges
regarding the codification of regulations published by the Secretary, as well as four
remaining actions against the FWS for its "subsequent refusal to issue permits for
7
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district court denied the motion after determining (1) the chal-
lenge was subject to review under the APA and (2) the plaintiffs
had standing because the parties suffered an injury-in-fact and es-
tablished a causal connection between the Listing Rule action and
the alleged injury.38
In In re Polar Bear I," the District Court for the District of Co-
lumbia faced an even greater challenge in the wake of an order
consolidating five actions under its regular district jurisdiction with
six related actions from other districts. 40 Among the challenging
parties were: the State of Alaska, Safari Club International & Safari
Club International Foundation (SCI); California Cattlemen's Asso-
ciation and the Congress of Racial Equality; the CBD and Green-
peace; and Conservation Force, the Inuvialuit Council, hunting and
trapping organizations, and other interested individuals.41 Further-
more, several groups intervened on behalf of both sides, including
the Alaska Oil and Gas Association and the Arctic Slope Regional
Corporations, which intervened as defendants against the CBD's
challenge.4 2 SCI, as a plaintiff in its own action against the FWS,
intervened as a defendant against the CBD, while plaintiff CBD in-
tervened as a defendant in the remaining challenges to the
Listing.43
On October 20, 2009, the plaintiffs filed motions for summary
judgment against the FWS.4 4 The CBD alleged the Listing Rule was
"arbitrary and capricious" under the APA because the polar bear
was entitled to higher protection under the ESA, while the remain-
ing plaintiffs alleged it was arbitrary and capricious because the po-
lar bear did not even qualify as a threatened species. 45 Specifically,
one element of the CBD's argument was that the FWS employed
such a narrow statutory interpretation that it "set[ ] the bar for an
'endangered' listing impossibly high ... [and] contravene [d] the
purpose of the ESA, which is to provide a flexible approach to pro-
importing sport-hunted polar bear trophies" which were valid under the MMPA.
In re Polar Bear III, 794 F. Supp. 2d at 78 n.17. Instead, the court only addressed
the challenges against the Listing Rule. Id.
38. See In re Polar Bear 1, 627 F. Supp. 2d at 21-27 (outlining court's holding).
39. 748 F. Supp. 2d 19 (D.D.C. 2010).
40. Id. at 21 (explaining consolidation of claims by Judicial Panel on Multi-
District Litigation).
41. See id. at 20-21 (outlining five separate actions parties filed in response to
Listing Rule and listing parties).
42. In re Polar Bear III, 794 F. Supp. 2d at 78 (detailing intervening parties in
case).
43. See id. (describing parties intervening on behalf of FWS).
44. See id. (outlining case's procedural posture).
45. See id. (describing parties' claims).
8
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tecting species so that they can be recovered and delisted."46 On
December 7, 2009, the FWS filed a cross-motion for summary
judgment.47
On October 20, 2010, the district court held an initial hearing
that centered on the issue of "whether it must review the agency's
interpretation of the ESA listing classifications under step one or
step two of the familiar framework set forth in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc.
v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc."48 In an opinion issued on
November 4, 2010, the court in In re Polar Bear II found the FWS
"failed to adequately explain the legal basis for its Listing Rule." 49
Specifically, the district court rejected the FWS' argument that to
be considered an endangered species under the ESA the species
must be in "imminent danger of extinction," instead finding the
statutory definition of "endangered species" was ambiguous. 50 The
court noted that because the FWS "failed to acknowledge [the] am-
biguities in the definition of an endangered species," it could not
"defer to the agency's plain-meaning interpretation nor impose its
own interpretation of the statute."5 1 As a result, the district court
remanded the Listing Rule to the agency due to ambiguity and de-
clined to rule on the merits of the cross-motions for summary judg-
ment at that time.52
On December 22, 2010, however, the FWS provided the court
with a supplemental explanation, finding that even in light of treat-
ing "the phrase 'in danger of extinction' in the definition of an
endangered species as ambiguous," the record did not support the
conclusion that the polar bear met the statutory requirements
46. Id. at 85 (describing agency decision as contrary to Congressional intent).
The In re Polar Bear III court noted, "According to CBD, nothing in the text, struc-
ture, or legislative history of the ESA supports the [FWS]'s conclusion that the
temporal proximity of an extinction threat is the controlling distinction between a
threatened and an endangered species." Id.
47. See In re Polar Bear III, 794 F. Supp. 2d at 85 (outlining timeline of motions
filed in case). The defendant-intervenors filed their cross-motions for summary
judgment on January 19, 2010. Id.
48. Id. at 79 (citing Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Defense Council,
Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984)) (examining appropriate standard of review).
49. In re Polar Bear II, 748 F. Supp. 2d 19, 22 (D.D.C. 2010) (noting CBD
argued Listing Rule was "arbitrary and capricious" by focusing on term "immi-
nent"). The CBD believed the FWS violated the APA because the polar bear
should have been listed as endangered rather than threatened. Id. at 25.
50. Id. at 22 (rejecting interpretation of endangered as "imminent").
51. Id. (noting underlying ambiguity).
52. Id. (citing to Peter Pan Bus Lines, Inc. v. Fed. Motor Carrier Safety Ad-
min., 471 F.3d 1350, 1354 (D.C. Cir. 2006)) (explaining reason for not ruling on
merits).
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under Section Four to be classified as an endangered species.53 Af-
ter allowing parties to submit responses to the FWS' supplemental
explanation, the court heard arguments on all of the plaintiffs' List-
ing Rule challenges at a second motions hearing on February 23,
2011.54 More than six years after the FWS was petitioned to desig-
nate the polar bear as a protected species under the ESA, the listing
determination was finally upheld.55 On June 30, 2011, the District
Court for the District of Columbia granted summary judgment the
FWS' favor and rejected all challenges raised against it with regard
to the Listing Rule.56
On March 1, 2013, in response to the plaintiffs' appeals, the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in In re Polar
Bear V affirmed the lower court's ruling in the FWS' favor.57 The
issue before the appellate court was whether the Listing Rule was a
product of reasoned decisionmaking in light of the record FWS
considered.58 Relying in part on the fact that the appellants did not
specifically identify any mistake or oversight in the agency's data or
reasoning, the court found the appellants' challenges "amount[ed]
to nothing more than competing views about policy and science."59
A request for a rehearing was denied on April 29, 2013, and the
53. In re Polar Bear III, 794 F. Supp. 2d at 79 (outlining case's procedure).
The In re Polar Bear III court articulated, "The FWS reiterated that the polar bear
met ESA's the [sic] definition of a threatened species at the time of listing." Id.
54. Id. (outlining case's argument history).
55. Id. (holding that agency action was not arbitrary and capricious).
56. Id. at 68-70 (upholding agency's listing of polar bear as threatened species
under ESA). District court proceedings were completed in November 2010, ap-
proximately two and a half years after the FWS issued its polar bear rules. Leppo,
supra note 9, at 10578 (summarizing In re Polar Bear Vs procedural posture). In
relevant part, the district court: (1) sustained the polar bear Listing Rule, rejecting
both challenges to the listing at all and NGO contentions that the listing should
have been "endangered" not "threatened;" (2) sustained the polar bear Section
4(d) rule against all ESA and APA challenges; (3) held that FWS had violated
NEPA in failing to prepare either an EA or EIS for the Section 4(d) rule; and (4)
sustained the import ban on polar bear trophies." Id. Because of the court's
NEPA holding, the final Section 4(d) rule was vacated and remanded; however,
pending completion of the remand, the court reinstated the substantially identical
interim Section 4(d) rule, which also had not undergone any NEPA process. Id.
57. In re Polar Bear V, 709 F.3d 1, 9 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (upholding agency's
listing of polar bear as threatened species under ESA). For a discussion of the D.C.
Circuit's rationale, see infra notes 170-210 and accompanying text.
58. See In re Polar Bear I, 627 F. Supp. 2d 16, 18-19 (D.D.C. 2009) (describing
big game hunting groups bringing APA claim against FWS for creating ban on
import of sport-hunted bear trophies otherwise legal under MMPA); see also In re
Polar Bear II, 748 F. Supp. 2d 19, 20-21 (D.D.C. 2010) (outlining five separate
actions parties filed in response to Listing Rule).
59. In re Polar Bear V, 709 F.3d at 9 (quoting In re Polar Bear III, 794 F. Supp. 2d
at 69) (rejecting appellants' challenges); Am. Wildlands v. Kempthorne, 530 F.3d
991, 1000 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (describing reality of dispute at hand).
10
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Supreme Court denied certiorari on October 7, 2013, marking the
apparent conclusion to the eight-year saga.60
III. BACKGROUND
The complex listing process outlined in the ESA's statutory
framework is integral to the challenges brought before the D.C. Cir-
cuit in In re Polar Bear V61 The motivation behind enacting the
ESA, the species listing regulations, and the subsequent protections
afforded to a protected species are at the heart of the litigation in
this case. 62 Additionally, global warming's effect on the polar bear
lends to the controversy of the polar bear's listing. Furthermore,
both the standard of review agency action is afforded under the
APA and related listing rule litigation play a large role in the out-
come of a challenge to an ESA Listing Rule.63
A. Global Climate Change
The United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
has identified several categories or "sectors" that are, or stand to be,
affected by global climate change. 64 These sectors include: agricul-
ture and food supply, coastal and marine ecosystems and living, en-
ergy supply and demand, frequency and intensity of wildfires, air
quality and heat-related illnesses affecting human health, water
quality and supply, transportation infrastructure, and ultimately
United States national security.65 While data shows that the global
climate fluctuates naturally over extended cycles of time, scientists
maintain that the recent and significant changes in the global cli-
mate cannot be attributed to natural causes alone. 66
60. Safari Club Int'l v. Jewell, 134 S.Ct. 310 (2013) (denying petition for writ
of certiorari).
61. In re Polar Bear V, 709 F.3d at 3 (describing relevant ESA background); see
also Lawrence R. Liebesman et al., The Endangered Species Act and Climate Change -
Current Issues, SRO21 ALI-ABA 227, 236 (2009) (describing critical distinction).
62. In re Polar Bear V 709 F.3d at 8 (describing standard of review).
63. Ashling P. McAnaney, Remembering the Spirit of the Endangered Species Act: A
Case for Narrowing Agency Discretion to Interpret "Significant Portion" of a Species' Range,
36 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 431, 438 (2006) (outlining ESA's early history).
64. Climate Change Impacts, supra note 2 (explaining areas global climate
change impacts).
65. Id. (describing areas global climate change impacts).
66. Causes of Climate Change, ENVrTL. PROT. AGENcy, http://epa.gov/cli-
matechange/science/causes.html (last updated Sept. 9, 2013) (observing human
activities as most likely source for warming especially since mid-twentieth century).
Fluctuations in the climate system can result from natural causes including vol-
canic eruptions and natural changes in solar energy and greenhouse gas concen-
trations. Id.
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Notably, since the Industrial Revolution began in 1750, human
activities have added substantial levels of heat-trapping gases, pri-
marily carbon dioxide (C0 2 ), into the atmosphere, which, in turn,
increase the "greenhouse effect" and result in a measurable in-
crease in the Earth's surface temperature.67 Furthermore, between
1990 and 2011, "the total radiative forcing from greenhouse gases
added by humans to the Earth's atmosphere increased by 30 per-
cent," with CO2 accounting for approximately eighty percent of that
increase.68 As a result, "seven of the top 10 warmest years on record
have occurred since 1990," and the decade between "2001-2010 was
the warmest decade on record worldwide." 69
Global warming poses a distinct problem for the polar bear,
which relies on sea ice for survival.70 The Arctic Ocean, home to
the polar bear, goes through a fluctuation of sea ice levels year-
round.71 In September, the area covered by ice is at its smallest due
to the summer melting season.72 On the whole, the total Arctic
area covered by sea ice has decreased, and as of September 2012, it
67. Id. (describing greenhouse effect's science). The EPA provides an accessi-
ble explanation of how the greenhouse effect works, describing:
When sunlight reaches Earth's surface, it can either be reflected back
into space or absorbed by Earth. Once absorbed, the planet releases
some of the energy back into the atmosphere as heat (also called infrared
radiation). Greenhouse gases (GHGs) like water vapor (H20), carbon
dioxide (CO 2 ), and methane (CH 4) absorb energy, slowing or preventing
the loss of heat to space. In this way, GHGs act like a blanket, making
Earth warmer than it would otherwise be.
Id. See also 2014 Climate Action Report (Draft/Not Final), U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
STATE, Chapter 3, 8 (Sept. 26, 2013), available at http://www.state.gov/e/oes/cli-
mate/ccreport2014/ (noting atmospheric concentrations of CO2 have risen ap-
proximately thirty nine percent since 1750). In 2011, fossil fuel combustion
accounted for 94.0 percent of the United States' CO 2 emissions. Id.
68. CLIMATE CHANGE INDICATORs, supra note 11, at 6 (describing climate forc-
ing). According to the EPA, "Climate or 'radiative' forcing is the measurement of
how substances such as greenhouse gases affect the amount of energy absorbed by
the atmosphere. An increase in radiative forcing means a heating effect, which
leads to warming." Id.
69. Id. at 7 (describing global temperature statistics).
For further information on the United States' specific greenhouse gas emis-
sion data, see 2014 Climate Action Report (Draft/ Not Final), DEPT. OF STATE, Chapter
3 (Sept. 26, 2013), available at http://www.state.gov/e/oes/climate/ccreport2014/
. The report notes that, as of 2011, 94% of the U.S.' greenhouse gas emissions are
from fossil fuel combustion, and in 2010, the U.S. contributed 18% to the total
global Co2 increase from fossil fuel combustion. Id.
70. See Polar Bear-Sea Ice Relationships, http://alaska.usgs.gov/science/biology/
polarbears/pbear -sea ice.html (last updated Feb. 4, 2014) (describing polar
bear's reliance on sea ice for all functions of life cycle).
71. Id. (describing changes in Arctic sea ice); see also CLIMATE CHANGE INDICA-
TORS, supra note 11, at 48 (describing seasonal pattern of Arctic sea ice levels).
72. CLIMATE CHANGE INDICATORS, supra note 11, at 8 (noting September as
month with lowest level of sea ice).
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was the smallest amount ever recorded.73 The Arctic sea ice that is
present has become thinner overall, putting sea ice at a greater risk
for further melting.74
Unfortunately, however, as of March 2013, there were "no
known regulatory mechanisms in place at the national or interna-
tional level that directly and effectively address" the Arctic's sea ice
loss caused by greenhouse gas emissions.75 In September 2013,
President Obama released a draft of the 2014 U.S. Climate Action
Plan, the first comprehensive national plan to address the issue of
climate change.76 The Climate Action Plan outlines a summary of
the United States' past and current greenhouse gas emissions, as
well as projections of future emissions, impacts of climate change in
the United States, and proposed policy measures to address the is-
sue.77 Currently pending before the Supreme Court, is the issue of
whether the EPA has the authority to regulate greenhouse gases
under the Clean Air Act as part of President Obama's Climate Ac-
tion Plan, absent congressional action.78
B. The Endangered Species Act
The ESA's history began when Congress passed the Endan-
gered Species Preservation Act of 1966, which centered on protec-
tion for endangered species.79 By 1969, the Act became the
Endangered Species Conservation Act, adding a listing possibility
73. Id. at 48 (noting lowest sea ice extent on record).
74. Id. at 8 (describing thinning ice trend and growing risk of melting).
75. CITES, supra note 5, at 13 (describing inadequate laws addressing green-
house gas emissions issue).
76. See 2014 Climate Action Report (Draft/Not Final), U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
STATE, available at http://www.state.gov/e/oes/climate/ccreport2014/ (last visited
Apr. 28, 2014).
77. See id. (describing topics covered by Climate Action Report). For further
information about the Climate Action Report's policies and measures aimed to
reduce greenhouse gas emissions see id. at Chapter 4, available at http://www.state.
gov/documents/organization/214946.pdf (last visited Apr. 28, 2014).
78. See Lawrence Hurley, Justices Question Obama climate change regulations,
REUTERS (Feb. 24, 2014) http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/02/24/us-usa-
court-climate-idUSBREA1NO6Q20140224 (describing Supreme Court challenge to
President Obama's Climate Action Plan); see also Greg Stohr & Mark Drajem,
Obama's Climate-Change Policy Questioned at Supreme Court, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 24,
2014) http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-02-24/obama-s-climate-change-pol-
icy-questioned-at-supreme-court.html (describing Supreme Court Challenge to
EPA's authority to impose permit requirements on power plants and factories
under Clean Air Act). The Supreme Court decision's in Utility Air Regulatory Group
v. EPA is anticipated in June 2014. See ScoTus BLOG, Utility Air Regulatory Group
v. EPA, http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/utility-air-regulator-group-v-
environmental-protection-agency/ (last visited Apr. 28, 2014).
79. McAnaney, supra note 63, at 437-38 (outlining ESA's early history).
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for "subspecies," as well adding the language "at risk of worldwide
extinction" to the definition of a endangered species.80 President
Nixon, however, was not satisfied with the changes, noting that the
1969 act "simply d[id] not provide the kind of management tools
needed to act early enough to save a vanishing species."8 1 Thus
came the birth of the ESA of 1973, which incorporated subspecies
and populations into the definition of species and added the
threatened category to cover species threatened throughout a Sig-
nificant Portion of its Range (SPR) rather than only those facing
extinction worldwide. 82 Furthermore, the new Act defined "conser-
vation" as "the use of all methods and procedures which are neces-
sary to bring any endangered species or threatened species to the
point at which the measures provided . . . are no longer neces-
sary."83 As Congress stipulated, the Act's purpose is "to provide a
means whereby the ecosystems upon which endangered species and
threatened species depend may be conserved, [and] to provide a
program for the conservation of such endangered species and
threatened species."84
1. Listing Rule Process
Under the ESA, a species may be listed as "threatened" when it
"is likely to become an endangered species within the foreseeable
future throughout all or a significant portion of its range" and "en-
dangered" when a species or subspecies "is in danger of extinction
throughout all or a significant portion of its range." 5 Because the
Act's listing designations come with regulatory prohibitions for
80. Carmen Thomas Morse, Listing Under the Endangered Species Act: How Low
Can You Go?, 47 IDAHO L. REV. 559, 562 (2011) (describing ESA's evolution).
81. Id. (quoting President Nixon urging stronger protections for species); see
also McAnaney, supra note 63, at 438 (describing President Nixon's view on inade-
quacy of United States law to save species early enough).
82. Morse, supra note 80, at 565 (explaining amendments to ESA). A "spe-
cies" is a "biological classification comprising a 'group of populations which are . . .
reproductively isolated from other such groups, but which are actually or poten-
tially capable of interbreeding among themselves' and thereby producing fertile
offspring." Id. (quoting MICHAEL THAIN & MICHAEL HicIG1AN, THE PENGUIN Dic,
TIONARY OF BIOLOGY 582 (9th ed. 1994)). While a subspecies "ranks immediately
below a species and designates a population of a particular geographic region ge-
netically distinguishable from other such populations of the same species and ca-
pable of interbreeding successfully with them where its range overlaps theirs." Id.
(quoting Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary). See also In re Polar Bear V, 709
F.3d 1, 3 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (citing 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b) (2012)) (providing back-
ground on ESA enactment via Congress' stated purposes for enactment).
83. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(3) (2012) (defining conservation).
84. 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b) (outlining Act's purpose).
85. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(6),(20) (defining threatened and endangered species).
14
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states, federal agencies, and people who use or rely on the land in
the species' range, the greater flexibility the threatened species clas-
sification created substantially broadened the potential impact that
ensuing protective regulations have on those parties.86
Pursuant to ESA's Section Three, the Secretary of the Interior
and the Secretary of Commerce (collectively, Secretary) are vested
with the power to designate species listings and promulgate protec-
tive regulations for those designated species, along with the sole
power to "delist" a species that has been listed under the ESA. 87
The ESA's listing authority is delegated pursuant to the FWS and
the National Marine Fisheries Service's (NMFS) codified joint regu-
lations, granting each jurisdiction over different species types.8 8
Aside from the option to make an independent finding to list a
species, under the Citizen Suit Provision, "interested persons" may
also petition the listing agency to list a species, at which time the
agency is mandated to investigate and issue findings on the listing
determination within ninety days of receiving the petition. 9
Upon a finding that action is warranted, the listing authority
must issue a proposed regulation to implement the action includ-
ing a "summary of the data upon which the proposed rule is based,
a showing of the relationship of the data to the proposed rule, and
a summary of factors affecting the species."90 A sixty-day period for
public comment and peer review follows the rule proposal.9 1 Then,
86. McAnaney, supra note 63, at 439 (describing new ESA language's effect).
87. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(15) (describing Secretary of Interior's authority to make
listing designations).
88. 50 C.F.R. § 402.01(b) (providing types of species FWS and NMFS have
authority over for listing). The regulation states:
The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) and the National Marine Fish-
eries Service (NMFS) share responsibilities for administering the Act.
The Lists of Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants are found
in 50 C.F.R. 17.11 and 17.12 and the designated critical habitats are
found in 50 C.F.R. 17.95 and 17.96 and 50 C.F.R. Part 226. Endangered
or threatened species under the jurisdiction of the NMFS are located in
50 C.F.R. 222.23(a) and 227.4. If the subject species is cited in 50 C.F.R.
222.23(a) or 227.4, the Federal agency shall contact the NMFS. For all
other listed species the Federal Agency shall contact the FWS.
Id.
89. See In re Polar Bear V, 709 F.3d 1, 3 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (citing 16 U.S.C.
§ 1533(b) (3) (A)) (discussing "interested person" portion of statute). The listing
authority may conclude its findings in one of three ways: "(1) the petition action is
warranted, (2) the petition action is not warranted, and (3) the petitioned action is
warranted but precluded." McAnaney, supra note 63, at 440 (describing process of
citizen suit petitioning); accord 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(3)(B)(i)-(iii) (noting Secre-
tary's possible options).
90. McAnaney, supra note 63, at 440 (outlining agency's mandated listing pro-
cess under ESA); accord 50 C.F.R. § 424.16 (2012) (describing proposed rules).
91. 50 C.F.R. § 424.16 (describing process of proposed listing rules).
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the agency must issue a final listing rule or formally withdrawal the
proposal within one year.92
Under Section Four, the ESA outlines five listing factors, any of
which can provide a basis for a listing determination: "(A) the pre-
sent or threatened destruction, modification, or curtailment of [the
species'] habitat or range; (B) overutilization for commercial, rec-
reational, scientific, or educational purposes; (C) disease or preda-
tion; (D) the inadequacy of existing regulatory mechanisms; or (E)
other natural or manmade factors affecting [the species'] contin-
ued existence."93 Section Four further requires listing determina-
tions be made:
[S] olely on the basis of the best scientific and commercial data
available . .. after conducting a review of the status of the
species and after taking into account those efforts, if any,
being made by any State or foreign nation . . whether by
predator control, protection of habitat and food supply,
or other conservation practices.94
The same five listing factors apply when the Secretary delists a
species. 95
2. Critical Habitat Designation
Section Four of the ESA requires a listing agency to designate a
listed species' "critical habitat" concurrently to listing the species.96
Critical Habitat Designations (CHD) are an important facet of the
ESA framework for many reasons, but particularly because of the
direct relationship between the animal's survival and the suste-
nance of its habitat, as well as the legal ramifications that follow
listing the habitat as protected under the ESA.97 CHDs are con-
fined to "the specific areas within the geographical area occupied
92. McAnaney, supra note 63, at 440-41 (describing ESA listing process' proce-
dural requirements).
93. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(1)(A)-(E) (outlining factors for listing endangered
or threatened species).
94. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b) (1) (A) (emphasis added) (discussing further require-
ments for listing).
95. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a) (1) (A)-(E) (outlining factors for delisting endangered
or threatened species).
96. Id. (outlining Section Four rules regarding endangered and threatened
species determination). Additionally, Section 4(f) imposes an affirmative duty on
a listing agency to create and enforce recovery plans to recover and improve the
listed species' status, however, recovery plans do not need to be complete at the
time of listing. McAnaney, supra note 63, at 441; accord 16 U.S.C. 1533(f).
97. William H. Rodgers, Jr., NEPA Complements -Endangered Species Act, ENvr.
L. INDIAN COUNTRY § 1:27 (2013) (describing CHD's importance). Rodgers notes:
16
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by the species, at the time it is listed ... on which are found those
physical and biological features (I) essential to the conservation of
the species and (II) which may require special management
considerations."9 8
In 1978, Congress amended the ESA's definition of "species" to
include "any subspecies of fish or wildlife or plants[ ] and any dis-
tinct population segment of any species of vertebrate fish or wildlife
which interbreeds when mature."99 Pursuant to a joint policy on
Distinct Population Segments (DPS), a listing agency will deem a
species' sub-population a DPS based on "whether the particular
population is discrete, in trouble ('conservation status'), and signifi-
cant (which probes in various ways whether the population is im-
portant to the taxon)."I00 Congress expressly noted that this
designation should be used "sparingly," however, and the internal
"Policy Regarding the Recognition of Distinct Vertebrate Popula-
tion Segments Under the Endangered Species Act" (DPS Policy)
notes that only thirty species out of more than three hundred spe-
cies listed under the ESA had been given DPS status when the DPS
Policy was created in 1996.101 The DPS's two-prong requirement of
being both discrete and significant can be challenging to satisfy,
however there have been recent instances where a DPS was
designated.10 2
The designation of critical habitat is important for the biological reason
that habitat is the crucial parameter for species survival, for the legal rea-
son that critical habitat is protected from impairment or modification
under Section 7, and for the political reason that the geography staked
out as "critical" suddenly is burdened by servitudes for the benefit of the
protected species. It is hardly surprising, then, that the "critical habitat"
issue has been embroiled in controversy and the focus of legislative atten-
tion throughout the history of the ESA.
Id.
98. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(5)(A) (defining critical habitat); accord Leppo, supra
note 9, at 10579 (describing CHDs' limitations).
99. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(16) (defining species); accord Policy Regarding the Rec-
ognition of Distinct Vertebrate Population Segments Under the Endangered Spe-
cies Act, 61 Fed. Reg. 4722-01 (Feb. 7, 1996) [hereinafter DPS Policy] (explaining
DPS amendment to ESA). The DPS policy states, "Because the Secretary must '* *
* determine whether any species is an endangered species or a threatened spe-
cies' . . . it is important that the term 'distinct population segment' be interpreted
in a clear and consistent fashion. Furthermore, Congress has instructed the Secre-
tary to exercise this authority with regard to DPS's." DPS Policy, supra, at 4,722.
100. Rodgers, supra note 97 (describing DPS's definition).
101. DPS Policy, supra note 99, at 4725 (emphasizing limited nature of DPS
Policy's use).
102. See National Ass'n of Home Builders v. Norton, 340 F.3d 835 (9th Cir.
2003) (discussing discrete and significant requirements). In Home Builders, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found that the FWS did not
act arbitrarily and capriciously by designating the Arizona pygmy-owls as a DPS. Id.
17
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3. Regulatory Consultation and Take Protections
Section Seven of the ESA governs what actions federal agencies
are prohibited from undertaking once a species is listed under Sec-
tion Four.10 Section Seven states that any federal agency action
that may interfere with a protected species must consult with the
listing agency and obtain a biological opinion to determine if the
proposed project will jeopardize the survival of the listed species
and similarly if it will result in adverse modification.1 0 4 The consul-
tation process, as it is commonly called, makes the CHD an ex-
tremely important aspect of the ESA because it not only provides
listed species with Section Seven's broad protections, but ensures
agencies consult the FWS if an agency's project will affect a CHD. 05
Agency "action" is broadly defined as "all activities or programs of
any kind authorized, funded, or carried out, in whole or in part, by
Federal agencies in the United States."1 06 Furthermore, "action"
encompasses actions that "directly or indirectly caus[e] modifica-
tions to the land, water, or air."107
Broader than the Section Seven consultation process, which
applies only to federal action, the ESA's Section Nine applies to
"any person subject to the jurisdiction of the United States" with
respect to what actions are unlawful and prohibited in light of an
ESA listing.108 Under Section Nine, a person is prohibited from
taking a listed species.109 Defined broadly, the term "take" includes
"harassing, harming, pursuing, hunting, shooting, wounding, kill-
at 838. Specifically, the court observed that first "the FWS must find that a popula-
tion is discrete 'in relation to the remainder of the species to which it belongs' and
significant 'to the species to which it belongs."' Id. at 839 (citing DPS Policy, supra
note 99, at 4725).
103. 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (2012) (discussing Section Seven's importance).
104. Dave Owen, Critical Habitat and the Challenge of Regulating Small Harms, 43
ENvrL. L. REP NEWS & ANALYsis 10,662, 10,662 (2013) (describing ESA's regulatory
protections).
105. See Blake Armstrong, Maintaining the World's Marine Biodiversity: Using the
Endangered Species Act to Stop the Climate Change Induced Loss of Coral Reefs, 18 HAS-
TINGS W.-Nw. J. ENVrL. L. & POL'Y 429, 435 (2012) (describing importance of
ESA's Section Seven consultation process).
106. 50 C.F.R. § 402.2 (2009) (defining "action" for purposes of ESA Section
Seven); accord Armstrong, supra note 105, at 437-38 (discussing "action"); see also
Owen, supra note 104, at 10,662 (describing Section Seven's meaning).
107. 50 C.F.R. § 402.2 (defining "action"); accord Armstrong, supra note 105,
at 438 (defining actions encompassed under ESA Section Seven).
108. 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a) (2012) (describing who is governed under ESA Sec-
tion Nine); see also McAnaney, supra note 63, at 441 (explaining Section Nine
protections).
109. McAnaney, supra note 63, at 441 (defining acts Section Nine prohibits);
see also 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a) (1) (B) (prohibiting taking of any species within United
States or territorial sea thereof).
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ing, trapping, capturing, and collecting."o10 The term "harass" is
further defined as "an intentional or negligent act or omission that
creates the likelihood of injury to wildlife by annoying it to such an
extent as to significantly disrupt normal behavioral patterns, which
include breeding, feeding and sheltering.""' Furthermore, "harm"
is "any action that actually kills or injures wildlife through signifi-
cant habitat modification or degradation by significantly impairing
essential behavioral patterns, including breeding, feeding, and
sheltering." 12
In contrast to the expansive protections provided for endan-
gered species under the ESA, a threatened species may not necessa-
rily receive the same protections because under Section 4(d) the
agency can opt to give the species only what is deemed "necessary
for the conservation of the species."113 Section 4(d) allows the Sec-
retary to issue "special rules" to either increase or decrease the nor-
mal protections of threatened species." 4 Thus, if a species is listed
under a Special 4(d) rule, the rule's broad discretion allows the
agency, for example, to eliminate either Section Seven or Section
Nine protections for a species if it is listed as threatened rather than
endangered.115
110. McAnaney, supra note 63, at 441 (describing broad meaning of harm
under ESA); accord 16 U.S.C. § 1532 (19) (defining "take").
111. McAnaney, supra note 63, at 441 (detailing level of destruction needed
to constitute harassment and harm).
112. Id. (describing harm for critical habitats). In Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter
of Cmtys. for a Great Or., the Supreme Court found that the definition of "harm"
includes habitat modification or degradation, but only "where actual death or in-
jury of a protected animals [sic] occurs and where the plaintiff can prove that the
challenged action is a proximate cause of that injury or death." Armstrong, supra
note 105, at 439-440 (quoting Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great
Or., 515 U.S. 687, 695-697 (1995)).
113. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(d) (detailing lack of protections afforded to designated
threatened species); see also McAnaney, supra note 63, at 443 (explaining distinc-
tion under ESA Section 4(d)); Liebesman et al., supra note 61, at 236 (describing
distinction's impact).
114. See Welch, supra note 13, at 676-77 (describing Special Rule's discretion
and impact on protections for threatened species).
115. See Armstrong, supra note 105, at 437 (explaining impact of agency dis-
cretion pursuant to Special Rule under Section 4(d)); see also Little Known But Im-
portant Features of the Endangered Species Act, U.S. FisH & WILDLIFE SERV., http://www.
fws.gov/pacific/news/grizzly/esafacts.htm (last visited Oct. 22, 2013) (describing
special 4(d) rule).
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C. Standard of Review for Agency Action
The APA governs the judicial review standard for administra-
tive agency actions.' 16 Review of an agency's action is subject to the
APA's "arbitrary and capricious" standard.117 In 1983, the Supreme
Court explained in Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass'n v. State Farm
Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. (State Farm),118 that an agency acts
arbitrarily or capriciously if it:
[R] elied on factors which Congress has not intended it to
consider, entirely failed to consider an important aspect of
the problem, offered an explanation for its decision that
runs counter to the evidence before the agency, or is so
implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in
view or the product of agency expertise.119
Furthermore, a court's task is "a narrow one," in that a court
must only determine whether the agency action was the product of
"reasoned decisionmaking."1 20 A court may "uphold a decision of
less than ideal clarity if the agency's path may reasonably be dis-
cerned."12' While this establishes a strong presumption in favor of
the agency action, an agency must still "articulate a rational connec-
tion between the facts found and the choice made."122
Courts have established several deference tests for when an
agency's action is interpreting a statute or its own regulation.'2 3 In
116. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (2012) (describing APA's role regarding standard of
review for agency actions). The APA provides that agency action may be subject to
judicial review when a person suffers "legal wrong because of agency action, or [is]
adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant
statute." 5 U.S.C. § 702.
117. SeeJames C. Kilbourne, The Endangered Species Act Under the Microscope: A
Closeup Look from A Litigator's Perspective, 21 ENvrL. L. 499, 515 (1991) (describing
standard of judicial review that applies to ESA listing determinations); see also Ru-
fus C. Young, Jr., 2010 Update: How the Federal Endangered Species Act Affects Land Use,
SS001 ALI-ABA 495, 521 (2010) (noting standard of review for agency action).
118. 463 U.S. 29 (1983).
119. Id. at 43 (describing when agencies act arbitrarily and capriciously); see
also National Ass'n of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644, 645
(2007) (discussing when agencies act arbitrarily and capriciously under APA).
120. State Farm, 463 U.S. at 51 (noting court must judge agency action by rea-
soned decisionmaking).
121. Bowman Transp., Inc. v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 419 U.S. 281,
285 (1974) (citing Colo. Interstate Gas Co. v. Fed. Power Comm'n, 324 U.S. 581,
595 (1945)) (noting agency rationale need not be perfect).
122. State Farm, 463 U.S. at 51 (internal quotation marks omitted) (clarifying
level agency must prove).
123. For a discussion of deference granted to agency interpretation, see infra
notes 123-137 and accompanying text.
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Skidmore v. Swift & Co.,124 the Supreme Court examined the level of
deference given to an agency's interpretive rules.125 The Court
held that where an Administrator of an Act reaches a conclusion
based on a "body of experience and informed judgment," a court
may use the experience and judgment as guidance where it has
"power to persuade," even if it is not controlling.1 26
The year after State Farm, the Supreme Court established a two-
prong test in Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense CounciP27 that gov-
erns the judicial review of an administrative agency's statutory inter-
pretation when that agency holds the authority to administer the
statute.128 According to the Chevron test, a court must first deter-
mine if Congress spoke directly to the question at issue.129 If Con-
gress did speak directly to the issue, the court does not afford
deference to the agency.' 30 If there is ambiguity as to the Congres-
sional intent, however, the second inquiry is "whether the agency's
answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute." 13' In
the presence of doubt as to Congressional intent on an issue, it is
not a court's place to "substitute its own construction of a statutory
provision for a reasonable interpretation made by the administrator
of an agency"; rather, the court should afford the interpretation
deference. 3 2 In the case of Auer v. Robbins,'33 which dealt with a
question of an agency's interpretation of its own regulation, rather
than a statute, the Court noted that under Chevron step two, the
124. 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
125. Id. at 140.
126. Id. at 139 (noting that even absent controlling authority of agency's de-
termination, court may still use determination for guidance).
127. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
128. Id. at 842-45 (establishing two-prong framework for determining
agency's ability to interpret statutory language).
129. Id. at 842-43 (describing first part of two-prong Chevron test concerning
reviewing statutory interpretation of agency action under APA); see also Molly A.
Leckey & Stephanie A. Roy, Recent Decisions of the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit: Administrative Law, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 946, 957
(2004) (describing Chevron test).
130. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842 (explaining deference granted at Chevron step
one).
131. Id. at 843 (detailing Chevron step two analysis permitting reasonable
agency interpretation). The underlying rationale of Chevron step two surrounds
Congress' statutory empowerment of an agency to administer a program that by
definition entrusts the agency to formulate policy and rules to accomplish Con-
gress' intent, including filling any gaps implicitly or explicitly left by Congress. Id.
at 843-44.
132. Id. at 844 (describing judicial deference to agency's statutory
interpretation).
133. 519 U.S. 452 (1997).
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agency's interpretation is controlling unless "plainly erroneous or
inconsistent with the regulation." 13 4
The Supreme Court recently clarified the relationship between
Chevron and Auer in Gonzales v. Oregon.1 35 In Gonzales, the Court
noted that Auer applies when an administrative rule interprets the
issuing agency's own regulation.1 3 6 By contrast, Chevron applies
when the interpretation is of a statute and Congressional intent del-
egated power to the agency to make rules that carry the force of
law.137 Absent these circumstances, an agency interpretation is only
"entitled to respect" if it is persuasive under Skidmore.138
Other cases have demonstrated just how high the level of def-
erence should be when a court reviews agency action under the
APA.13 9 For example in Marsh v. Oregon Natural Resources Council,140
the Supreme Court noted that in matters where the issues "re-
quire [ ] a high level of technical expertise," an even higher level of
deference should be accorded to agency judgments. 141 With re-
spect to the range of regulatory measures afforded to listed species
under the ESA, listing agencies are also entitled to great deference
in their determinations. 142 In Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill,143 the
Supreme Court reinforced the breadth of Congress' discretion to
protect species with regulating measures under the ESA's Section
Seven. 144 In its analysis, the Court stated that the ESA may be ap-
134. Id. at 461 (quoting Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490
U.S. 332, 359 (1989)) (internal quotation marks omitted) (finding Auer easily met
deferential standard).
135. See Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 244 (2006) (holding Controlled
Substance Act does not allow Attorney General to prohibit doctors from prescrib-
ing drugs used for physician-assisted suicide permissible under state law).
136. Id. at 244 (citing Auer, 519 U.S. at 461463) (describing applicability of
Auer deference).
137. Id. (citing United States v. Mead, 533 U.S. 218, 226-27 (2001)) (clarifying
when Chevron interpretation applies).
138. Id. (citing Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 124, 140 (1944)) (noting
Skidmore applies when neither Chevron nor Auer apply).
139. For a discussion of administrative deference under APA review, see supra
notes 132-138 and infra notes 140-145 and accompanying text.
140. 490 U.S. 360 (1989).
141. Id. at 377 (quoting Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 412 (1976)) (in-
ternal quotation marks omitted) (describing standard of review involving technical
expertise involved).
142. For a discussion on judicial deference of agency listing of endangered
species, see infra notes 143-145 and accompanying text.
143. 437 U.S. 153 (1978) (affirming agency authority to list endangered spe-
cies under ESA regardless of government appropriation to dam construction pro-
ject threatening same listed, endangered species).
144. Id. at 192-94 (describing ruling). The Court in Tenn. Valley Auth. de-
clined to find Congressional project appropriations could repeal the ESA applica-
tion. Id. at 191.
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plied retroactively and can "supersede 'specific' congressional ap-
propriations," essentially holding that there are no exceptions to
the ESA's power to protect listed species from jeopardy, at least with
respect to federal agency action. 145
D. The Litigious History of ESA Interpretation in Listing Rule
Determinations
Despite the well-established rules for when courts should defer
to agency decisionmaking, the level of deference accorded to listing
agencies is not uniform among the different circuits.146 The D.C.
Circuit has closely followed the rationale in State Farm and Marsh
regarding deference to agency decisionmaking, noting that "review-
ing court must be 'at its most deferential' when examining conclu-
sions 'at the frontiers of science."1 47 The D.C. Circuit has also
emphasized courts "must proceed with particular caution, avoiding
all temptation to direct the agency in a choice between rational
alternatives. "148
Other circuits do not afford as much deference to agency deci-
sionmaking; the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Cir-
cuit in particular has demonstrated that deference does not mean
certain victory for a listing agency.149 In Defenders of Wildlife v. Nor-
ton (Defenders),15o the Ninth Circuit heard a challenge to the FWS'
listing of the flat-tailed horned lizard as a threatened species con-
cerning the proper focus of conservation efforts.''5 The court had
to tackle the meaning of the phrase "in danger of extinction
145. Linus Chen, National Association of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife
and the Meaning of Agency "Discretion", 28 ENvrL. L. REP. NEws & ANALYsis 10,039,
10,042 (2008) (describing Supreme Court's interpretation of ESA Section Seven in
Tenn. Valley Auth.).
146. For a discussion of variability of deference accorded listing agencies, see
infra notes 116-145 and accompanying text.
147. Am. Wildlands v. Kempthorne, 530 F.3d 991, 1000-01 (D.C. Cir. 2008)
(citing Balt. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 462 U.S. 87, 103 (1983))
(describing standard of review).
148. Id. at 1000 (citing Int'l Fabricare Inst. v. EPA, 972 F.2d 384, 389 (D.C.
Cir. 1992)) (establishing judicial limitations for review of agency decisionmaking).
In Am. Wildlands, groups brought suit against the FWS for its failure to list the west
slope cutthroat trout as a threatened species under the ESA, arguing the FWS'
decision was arbitrary and capricious. Id. at 993. The Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit disagreed, noting (1) the high level of deference af-
forded an agency's determination and (2) that none of the plaintiffs several claims
demonstrated that the agency acted unreasonably. Id. at 998.
149. For a discussion of Ninth Circuit deference to agency action, see infra
notes 150-157 and accompanying text.
150. 258 F.3d 1136 (9th Cir. 2001) (Defenders (Lizard)).
151. Id. at 1136-37 (describing challenge to FWS' decision not to list flat-tailed
horned lizard as threatened).
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throughout . . . a significant portion of its range" (SPR).i 5 2 The Ninth
Circuit ultimately looked to the ESA's legislative history, which re-
vealed that the amendment adding the threatened species listing
classification appeared to be Congress' attempt to add more flexi-
bility to providing wildlife protection.153 The history covered the
issue of a species being "endangered" in some areas, while
overpopulated in others, allowing the "discretion to list that animal
as merely threatened or to remove it from the endangered species
listing entirely while still providing protection in areas where it was
threatened with extinction." 154
The Ninth Circuit concluded that the FWS "necessarily has a
wide degree of discretion in delineating a 'significant portion of its
range,' since the term is not defined in the statute."155 The court
noted, however, that in a case such as the one before them, where
the record showed that the area in which a species would be ex-
pected to live is substantially less than the range the species histori-
cally inhabits, the agency must justify why that area would not
constitute an SPR.'56 The court admonished the agency for failing
to apply the "flexible standard" for determining the lizard was in-
deed in danger of extinction throughout an SPR and found that
the decision to withdraw the proposed listing rule was arbitrary and
capricious. 157
In 2010, in Center for Biological Diversity v. Lubchenco,'5 8 the Dis-
trict Court for the Northern District of California faced a challenge
to the decision not to list the ribbon seal as either threatened or
endangered under the ESA.1 59 The challengers in that case argued
the NMFS acted arbitrarily and capriciously by failing to consider
whether any DPS warranted listing in an SPR and utilizing an "irra-
tional time frame" with respect to the "foreseeable future."160 De-
spite that global climate change was affecting the ribbon seal in its
Arctic habitat, the court upheld the agency's determination that
listing was not warranted.16 '
152. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(6) (2012) (defining terms for ESA) (emphasis added).
153. Defenders (Lizard), 258 F.3d at 1144 (describing ESA's legislative history).
154. Id. (describing Congressional purpose of SPR language).
155. Id. at 1145 (describing breadth of agency's discretion in SPR
determination).
156. Id. (outlining agency's duty to explain SPR rationale).
157. Id. at 1146 (holding listing agency acted arbitrarily and capriciously).
158. 758 F. Supp. 2d 945 (N.D. Cal. 2010).
159. Id. at 947-48 (describing case's background).
160. Id. at 955 (outlining plaintiffs' arguments).
161. See generally id. (finding NMFS did not act arbitrarily and capriciously).
The Lubchenco court noted, "[T] he FWS actually used a mid-century date (forty-five
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The court noted the NMFS compared the ribbon seal to the
polar bear's recent ESA listing, specifically where the NMFS found
"ocean acidification, which is a result of increased carbon dioxide
in the atmosphere. . . may impact ribbon seal survival and recruit-
ment ... but that the nature and timing of such impacts are ...
extremely uncertain." 162 Furthermore, "anticipated . . . habitat
changes resulting from ocean warming, and loss of sea ice, have the
potential for negative impacts, but these impacts are not well understood."16 3
Instead, the NMFS placed the ribbon seal on the "Species of Con-
cern List" for the purpose of "increase [ing] public awareness about
the species, . . . further identify[ing] data deficiencies and uncer-
tainties in the species' status and the threats it face [d]," and provok-
ing research efforts to ascertain the species' status and threats.1 6 4
With respect to the polar bear, environmental organizations
sued the FWS in July 2008 for failing to issue a CHD concurrently
with its species listing.165 After reaching a court-approved settle-
ment, the FWS issued a final rule in December 2010, designating a
record 187,000 square miles of Alaska's North Slope and adjacent
area on the Outer Continental Shelf as critical habitat for the polar
bear, the largest CHD in the ESA's history.' 66 In Alaska Oil & Gas
Ass'n v. Salazar,'67 however, the United States District Court for the
District of Alaska rejected the FWS' CHD with respect to the polar
bear, finding the designation did not meet the statutory require-
ments for CHD under Section Four and the FWS failed to comply
with procedural requirements.16 8 SinceJanuary 11, 2013, there has
been no critical habitat designated for the polar bear.'6 9
years) for the foreseeable future for the polar bear decision . . . Also, like the
ribbon seal decision, the polar bear decision considered climate issues beyond the
forty-five year time frame. The foreseeable future analysis in the ribbon seal deci-
sion is not inconsistent with the polar bear decision." Id. at 967.
162. Id. at 952 (internal quotation marks omitted) (describing uncertainty of
impact on ribbon seal).
163. Lubchenco, 758 F. Supp. 2d at 952 (emphasis added) (acknowledging ef-
fects but observing high uncertainty involved).
164. Id. at 953 (citing AR 13 at 79,828) (describing NMFS's ultimate decision
to list ribbon seal as species of concern instead).
165. Leppo, supra note 9, at 10579 (describing failure to determine CHD for
polar bear concurrently with Listing Rule).
166. Id. (describing CHD process for polar bear).
167. 916 F. Supp. 2d 974 (D. Alaska 2013).
168. Id. at 1004 (holding record lacked sufficient evidence of physical or bio-
logical features for two units and FWS failed to provide adequate justification for
Alaska's comments not incorporated into Final Rule); see also Leppo, supra note 9,
at 10579 (describing CHD process for polar bear).
169. Leppo, supra note 9, at 10580 (noting polar bear CHD was vacated).
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IV. NARRATIVE ANALYSIS
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Colum-
bia Circuit framed its opinion with the highly deferential arbitrary
and capricious standard of review entitled to agency action under
the APA.o70 The court observed that its task as an appellate court
was narrow, with the "principal responsibility" being "to determine,
in light of the record considered by the agency, whether the Listing
Rule is a product of reasoned decisionmaking," citing State Farm.17 1
From the outset, the court opined that the Listing Rule was the
product of a "careful and comprehensive study and analysis." 172 In
support of the determination, the court highlighted that thirteen of
the fourteen parties that participated in peer review of the Listing
Rule found the FWS' conclusion was justified, compared to one re-
viewer who "express[ed] concern that the proposed rule was
flawed, biased, and incomplete."17 3
Furthermore, the court noted that because the foundation the
agency relied upon was "adequately explained and uncontested, sci-
entific experts (by a wide majority) support the agency's conclu-
sion," and because the appellants did not bring forth any scientific
evidence not considered by the FWS, the court was "bound to up-
hold the agency's determination."17 4 The court rejected each of
the seven different objections raised against the FWS' listing deter-
mination as meritless.175
170. In re Polar Bear V, 709 F.3d 1, 8-9 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (explaining standard
of review).
171. Id. at 3 (quoting Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983)).
172. Id. at 8 (noting agency's "scientific conclusions [were] amply supported
by data").
173. Id. (quoting Listing Rule, supra note 11, at 28,292-293) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted) (discussing peer reviewers' comments).
174. Id. at 9 (justifying court of appeals' holding).
175. In re Polar Bear V, 709 F.3d at 9 (observing flaws in appellants' claims
failed before fully addressing each claim individually). As the court noted, the
appellants' seven separate allegations were:
(1) FWS failed to adequately explain each step in its decisionmaking pro-
cess, particularly in linking habitat loss to a risk of future extinction; (2)
FWS erred by issuing a single, range-wide determination; (3) FWS relied
on defective population models; (4) FWS misapplied the term "likely"
when it determined that the species was likely to become endangered; (5)
FWS erred in selecting a period of 45 years as the "foreseeable future";
(6) FWS failed to "take into account" Canada's polar bear conservation
efforts; and (7) FWS violated Section 4(i) of the ESA by failing to give an
adequate response to the comments submitted by the State of Alaska re-
garding the listing decision.
Id. at 7-8.
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A. Inadequate Justification
The challengers first alleged the FWS failed to explain the cau-
sation between the predicted decrease in the polar bear habitat and
the species' endangerment pursuant to the APA's arbitrary and ca-
pricious standard.176 The court distinguished the case from Defend-
ers, where the Ninth Circuit rejected the FWS' decision not to list
the flat-tailed horned lizard, because the Listing Rule discussed in
In Re Polar Bear V provided an explanation supplemented by ample
evidence to support the agency's theory.'77 The FWS' Listing Rule
evidence was further bolstered by numerous experts who made the
same predictions.178 The D.C. Circuit noted that the FWS not only
provided a "discernible path" of decisionmaking, which is owed def-
erence from the court, but that "it also firmly articulate [d] a ra-
tional connection between the facts found and the choice
made." 79
The second claim alleged that the polar bear species was not
sufficiently threatened "throughout its range" to meet the statutory
listing requirement under Section 4(a) (1) (A).180 The court em-
barked on the highly fact-intensive inquiry, addressing the effects of
declining sea-ice on specific ecoregions of the polar bear's habitat
in light of the FWS' findings.18' In a related challenge, appellants
argued that the FWS "should have divided the species into Distinct
Population Segments for the purposes of this listing decision."18
The D.C. Circuit, however, found that the FWS properly employed
its DPS Policy and concluded a DPS was unwarranted.183 The ap-
pellants did not challenge the policy, but rather alleged the FWS
misapplied the policy.184 The court outlined the criteria for a DPS
176. Id. at 9 (restating appellants' claim); accord 5 U.S.C. 706(2) (A).
177. Id. at 9-10 (noting agency both considered and explained causation).
The court pointed to the Listing Rule where the FWS stated that "polar bears will
face increased competition for limited food resources, increased open water swim-
ming with increased risk of drowning, increasing interactions with humans with
negative consequences, and declining numbers that may be unable to sustain
ongoing harvests." Id. at 9 (citing Listing Rule, supra note 11, at 28,275).
178. Id. (explaining "wide majority" of scientific experts support agency's
determination).
179. Id. at 9 (quoting Am. Radio Relay League, Inc. v. FCC, 524 F.3d 227, 241
(D.C. Cir. 2008)) (discussing FWS' path of decisionmaking); see also Keating v.
F.E.R.C., 569 F.3d 427, 433 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (finding agency provided sufficient
explanation).
180. In re Polar Bear V, 709 F.3d at 10-12 (addressing appellants' claims that
FWS erred in concluding polar bear species was threatened throughout its range).
181. Id. (describing court's analysis).
182. Id. at 11 (describing appellants' challenges).
183. Id. (finding in FWS' favor on application of DPS Policy).
184. Id. (classifying appellants' claim).
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under the policy, defined the terms, and noted that the FWS prop-
erly considered whether all of the polar bear's nineteen subpopula-
tions of the four ecoregions satisfied the DPS criteria and ultimately
concluded the subpopulations were not DPS - a conclusion that
the court explained was entitled to deference.8 '3 Like with other
challenges that the FWS misapplied its DPS Policy, the court
pointed to the FWS' responses found in its Listing Rule that specifi-
cally addressed each claim, rather than inserting the court's own
opinion as to the claims' validity.186 Regarding the DPS claim, the
court concluded the FWS did not act arbitrarily or capriciously in
its action, noting there was nothing "to suggest that the agency's
decision to make a single, range-wide listing determination was
'plainly erroneous or inconsistent with' the DPS Policy."18 7
The appellants' third claim charged that the FWS mistakenly
relied on two population models that the United States Geological
Survey (USGS) developed, noting that the FWS did not "explain [ I]
the assumptions and methodology used in preparing the model
and provide [ ] a complete analytic defense should the model be
challenged." 88 The D.C. Circuit found the appellants' charge was
"plainly meritless."189 The court further noted, "[T] hat a model is
limited or imperfect is not, in itself, a reason to remand agency
decision based upon it."190 In addition, the court noted that the
accusation was contradicted by the fact that the USGS itself criti-
cized the FWS for not relying heavily enough on the models, thus
finding that the FWS' narrow reliance was not arbitrary and
capricious. 191
185. In re Polar Bear V, 709 F.3d at 12 (defining criteria for "discreteness")
(citing DPS Policy, supra note 99, at 4725). Specifically, the three criteria for a
Distinct Population Segment according to the DPS Policy are:
(1) Discreteness of the population segment in relation to the remainder
of the species to which it belongs; (2) The significance of the population
segment to the species to which it belongs; and (3) The population seg-
ment's conservation status in relation to the Act's standards for listing
(i.e., is the population segment, when treated as if it were a species, en-
dangered or threatened?).
Id. at 11.
186. Id. (emphasizing deference to agency).
187. Id. (quoting Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 512
(1994)) (noting court's task is to give "controlling weight" to agency's interpreta-
tion, not to choose between competing interpretations).
188. Id. at 13 (quoting Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 249 F.3d 1032, 1053-54
(D.C. Cir. 2001)) (alterations in original) (discussing appellants' third claim).
189. Id. (noting model did not have to be perfect).
190. In re Polar Bear V, 709 F.3d at 13 (citing Appalachian Power, 249 F.3d at
1052) (describing deference entitled to agency on agency models).
191. Id. at 14 (finding for FWS regarding challenge on population models).
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B. Ambiguity in the Statutory Language
The appellants' fourth challenge was that the FWS appeared to
adopt one definition of "likely" as the ESA standard for its
threatened species definition, but then subsequently failed to apply
it.192 The court, however, found this accusation "facially implausi-
ble" because there was no evidence in the Listing Rule that indi-
cated the FWS used this definition, and it accepted the FWS'
explanation that it interpreted "likely" as having its "'ordinary
meaning' or 'dictionary definition.'"s9 3 The appellants made an al-
ternative argument that the FWS "failed to apply any standard of
'likelihood' at all," but the court rejected the argument because
rulemaking agencies are "free to rely on common English usage
without adopting specialized definitions."19 4 The court further
noted that the appellants supplied no evidence that an ESA listing
was ever struck down for failing to define "likely" expressly.195
The appellants' fifth claim challenged the FWS' understanding
of the term "foreseeable" in the ESA's threatened species defini-
tion, particularly objecting that the FWS "failed to justify its defini-
tion of 'foreseeable' as a 45-year period."196 The issue stemmed
from the fact that the term foreseeable is not defined by either stat-
ute or regulation, and the FWS assesses what is foreseeable on a
case-by-case basis.' 97 The court rejected the appellants' definition
of foreseeability, which meant the "furthest period of time in which
[FWS] can reliably assess, based on predicted conditions," because
(1) there was no legal authority suggesting the FWS must adhere to
the appellants' definition, and (2) even applying that definition,
the FWS' definition was reasonable.198 Furthermore, the court
pointed out that once again the appellants did not challenge the
underlying data of the FWS' decision, rather, they merely chal-
lenged the FWS' interpretation and application of statutory lan-
guage. 199 The D.C. Circuit concluded on this claim by stating the
192. Id. (describing appellants' challenge).
193. Id. (accepting FWS' interpretation). The court noted, "A fundamental
canon of statutory construction is that, unless otherwise defined, words will be in-
terpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning." Id. at 15
(quoting Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42 (1979))
194. Id. at 15 (describing general rule of statutory interpretation).
195. In re Polar Bear V, 709 F.3d at 15 (noting lack of express definition of
term does not impede review process).
196. Id. at 7 (noting appellants' claim challenging FWS' definition of
foreseeability).
197. Id. at 15 (describing lack of statutory definition of foreseeability).
198. Id. (explaining rejection of appellants' challenge).
199. Id. at 16 (describing why appellants' challenge failed).
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agency's decision merely had to be "justifiable and clearly articu-
lated" to receive deference, rather than meet the APA's arbitrary
and capricious standard outlined in State Farm, and the court was
satisfied that the FWS passed on both elements. 200
C. State Complaints in The Peer Review Process
The D.C. Circuit next addressed the appellants' attack on the
FWS for failing to consider Canada's conservation practices when
determining whether to list the Polar Bear because Section
4(b) (1) (A) requires the FWS to "take into account those efforts . . .
made by any State or foreign nation."201 Once again, the court
rebuffed the appellants' claim, finding the FWS satisfied the ESA's
statutory criteria and noting the FWS specifically addressed this is-
sue in the Listing Rule. 2 0 2 The appellants argued in the alternative
that the FWS was under "an 'independent obligation' to 'take into
account' foreign conservation efforts in addition to" the ESA listing
requirements. 2 03 The D.C. Circuit stated that regardless of whether
there was an obligation, the fact that the FWS addressed the issue in
its Listing Rule meet its obligation. 204
Lastly, the D.C. Circuit addressed a separate argument the
State of Alaska raised accusing the FWS of failing to provide a suffi-
cient "written justification for [its] failure to adopt regulations con-
sistent with the [state's] comments or petition" pursuant to the
ESA's Section 4(i) requirement.205 While the court rejected the
FWS' notion that the response was not reviewable because it
deemed the response as a "procedural step" that becomes review-
able only upon final agency action, the court went on to find that
the argument from Alaska "plainly lack[ed] merit."206 As with the
previous claims, the court noted that the FWS acted in accordance
with the statutory requirement in Section Four, here responding in
200. In re Polar Bear V, 709 F.3d at 16 (quoting Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983)) (finding FWS did not act
arbitrarily and capriciously).
201. Id. at 17 (noting appellants' argument regarding Canada's polar bear
conservation efforts); accord 16 U.S.C. 1533(b)(1) (A).
202. In re Polar Bear V 709 F.3d at 16-17 (describing and rejecting state's claim
against Listing Rule process).
203. Id. at 16 (describing Canada's claim against FWS).
204. Id. at 16-17 (concluding FWS met statutory requirements under 16
U.S.C. 1533(b)(1) (A)).
205. Id. at 17 (citation omitted) (restating Alaska's claim against FWS).
206. Id. at 17-18 (rejecting Alaska's claim).
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a timely manner with a forty-five-page letter specifically addressing
the concerns Alaska raised.207
Despite that the ESA does not define what constitutes a "suffi-
cient written justification," particularly in terms of what substance
would render a response as inadequate, the court found that the
FWS acted reasonably in its response.208 Further, the court clarified
that Section 4(i) did not require the state be satisfied, or even
agree, with the agency's response; rather, the statute ensures the
agency was fully informed as to the state's "interests and concerns"
relating to its listing determination and regulation.209 The court
concluded by affirming the judgment of the district court below. 21 0
V. CRITICAL ANALYSIS
With respect to the claims against the FWS regarding the insuf-
ficiency of its justification and the individual state's complaints re-
garding the peer review process, the D.C. Circuit reasonably
reached the conclusion that the FWS did not act arbitrarily and ca-
priciously.211 With respect to Section Four's statutory ambiguity,
however, the case might have had a different outcome had the
court reviewed these particular claims directly under Chevron in-
stead of though a general arbitrary and capricious analysis.212 Fur-
ther, the D.C. Circuit failed entirely to consider or discuss the
actual impact of the distinction between whether the polar bear is
listed as threatened rather than endangered, thereby avoiding the
specific impact of the Special Rule and the failure to protect the
listing of the species that resulted in this case.213
A. Arbitrary & Capricious: The FWS Glides By Under State Farm
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Colum-
bia Circuit reasonably arrived at the conclusion that the FWS' polar
bear listing as threatened under the ESA's Section Four was not
207. In re Polar Bear V, 709 F.3d at 17 (stating case's facts).
208. Id. at 18 (noting ESA did not provide guidance for what written justifica-
tion requires).
209. Id. at 19 (holding Section 4(i) did not require further justification to
appease State); accord 16 U.S.C. 1533(i).
210. Id. (affirming District Court for District of Columbia's judgment).
211. Id. at 15-19 (noting length ofjustification and adherence to listing rule
process deadlines).
212. In re Polar Bear V, 709 F.3d at 15-19 (finding FWS' interpretation of Sec-
tion 4(i) was reasonable).
213. Id. (failing to address impact of distinction between listing polar bear as
threatened as opposed to endangered).
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arbitrary or capricious. 214 In light of the highly deferential stan-
dard afforded to agency action under the APA, which is reflected in
the precedent of both the D.C. Circuit and the Supreme Court, the
court's holding is neither surprising nor inconsistent with prece-
dent.215 The D.C. Circuit's analysis was particularly appropriate be-
cause the FWS had conducted an extensive review over the course
of three years, the matter involved scientific information, and the
FWS addressed each concern raised during the extensive peer re-
view process. 216 Thus, in the absence of an outright violation of a
procedural requirement in the listing process, it was extremely un-
likely that the court would not ultimately uphold the agency's
determination. 217
For example, from the outset, neither Canada nor Alaska stood
much of a chance against the presumption in favor of the FWS on
their complaint regarding the peer review process.218 Challenging
the FWS' responses during the peer review process is equivalent to
asking the court to rule on the scientific information itself, which
the court repeatedly has emphasized is not its role.219 Had the
agency failed to address the state concerns entirely or had they ad-
dressed the concerns only briefly, the result may have been differ-
ent; however, that was simply not the case here.220
B. Chevron vs. Skidmore
While ultimately affirming the district court below, the court
bypassed the two-step framework established in Chevron - an ap-
214. See Jonathan V. Volinski, Recent Developments in Environmental Law, 26
TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 333, 352 (2013) (describing consistency between court's analysis
and administrative review precedent).
215. See id. (describing court's deference due to technical nature underlying
listing determination); see also Leppo, supra note 9, at 10575 (describing frequency
of record challenges and difficulty in prevailing over agency). As Leppo described,
"Record review challenges to federal agency decisions in the environmental con-
text are, arguably, among the most frequently litigated and, yet, the least fre-
quently won or favorably settled federal cases." Id.
216. See Brief of Defendants-Appellees, supra note 10, at *2-4 (noting FWS'
extensive review).
217. See Volinski, supra note 214, at 352 (describing court's deference due to
technical nature underlying listing determination); see also Mary Christina Wood,
Advancing the Sovereign Trust of Government to Safeguard the Environment for Present and
Future Generations (Part 1): Ecological Realism and the Need for a Paradigm Shift, 39
ENvT.. L. 43, 59-60 (2009) (observing court's deferential standard).
218. See Leppo, supra note 9, at 10583 (describing difficulty in prevailing over
agency in record review challenges).
219. See In re Polar Bear V, 709 F.3d 1, 3 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (noting court's
refusal to rule on scientific information).
220. See Leppo, supra note 9, at 10583 (describing procedural challenges be-
ing most likely avenue to succeed over agency).
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proach diametrically opposed to the district court below, other cir-
cuits and district courts, and the court's own precedent.22' While
the D.C. Circuit outlined the same standard of review as the district
court below it with respect to the standard being "narrow," with a
strong presumption of validity in favor of the agency, and only in
light of the record before the agency when it made its decision, the
D.C. Circuit sharply diverged from the rationale applied below
thereafter.222 While this was in the D.C. Circuit's power because it
reviewed the agency's determination directly, the court could have
still employed Chevron, as the Ninth Circuit did in the case of De-
fenders, because this case involved agency interpretation.2 2 3 Instead,
the court appeared to employ a more "common-sense" approach in
its analysis, rather than utilize Chevron.224
The D.C. Circuit instead elected to employ Skidmore with re-
spect to the challenge to the peer review process under Section
4(i), rather than Chevron and Auer, finding that the agency action
was not entitled to deference under Gonzalez.225 The court noted
that Auer did not apply where the regulation "merely parrots" the
statute and the "interpretation does not itself carry the force of law
warranting deference." 226 Thus, the court found that under Skid-
more, the FWS' interpretation was "'entitled to respect' only to the
extent it has the 'power to persuade."' 227
Alternatively, with respect to the meaning of "likely" in the def-
inition of "threatened," the court conceded that there was no ex-
plicit definition of the term in the statute.228 That would put the
221. See Nw. Ecosystem Alliance v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 475 F.3d 1136,
1140 (9th Cir. 2007) (noting court reviewed FWS' ESA interpretation according to
Chevron framework); see also Center for Biological Diversity v. Lubchenco, 758 F.
Supp. 2d 945, 963 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (examining whether Chevron applied to
agency's interpretation of "foreseeable future"). The district court in Lubchenco
ultimately found Chevron did not apply, noting the cases defendants supplied
"rel [ied] instead ... [on] formal policies or criteria used to evaluate all kinds of
petitions, not the specific interpretation of a term in the context of a single peti-
tion." Lubchenco, 758 F. Supp. 2d at 964.
222. Compare In re Polar Bear III, 794 F. Supp. 2d 65, 80 (D.D.C. 2011) (apply-
ing standard of review with Chevron analysis), with In re Polar Bear V, 709 F.3d at 8
(failing to employ Chevron framework in analysis).
223. In re Polar Bear V, 709 F.3d at 8 (citing Holland v. Nat'l Mining Ass'n, 309
F.3d 808, 814 (D.C. Cir. 2002)) (describing standard of review).
224. See Leppo, supra note 9, at 10576 (noting that Chevron bolsters deference
in judicial review of administrative action under APA).
225. See In re Polar Bear V 709 F.3d at 18-19 (citing Gonzales v. Oregon, 546
U.S. 243, 255-56 (2006)) (discussing approach to peer review process).
226. Id. at 18.
227. Id. (quoting Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 256) (outlining standard of review).
228. Id. at 19 (interpreting ESA's language).
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issue directly under the ambit of Chevron's framework under step
two because the challenge was to the agency's statutory interpreta-
tion absent explicit congressional intent.229 Rather than mention
Chevron, Auer, or even Skidmore, however, the court pointed to the
fact that no evidence was presented showing that any ESA listing
had been struck down due to the agency failing to define the term
"likely."s230
In examining the FWS' standard for foreseeability with regard
to the definition's foreseeable future requirement under 16 U.S.C.
1532(20), the D.C. Circuit similarly acknowledged that "foresee-
able" was not defined, but it did not employ Chevron.231 The court
echoed the agency's argument that foreseeability is determined on
a case-by-case basis, noting that the issue was not whether the
agency could have chosen another time period "so long as the
agency's decision was justifiable and clearly articulated," following
State Farm.2 32 The D.C. Circuit's finding is problematic, however,
when evaluating the agency's interpretation in light of Congress'
explicit purpose in creating the ESA: "[T]o halt and reverse the
trend toward species extinction, [at] whatever the cost."2 33 Conse-
quently, under Chevron, the court would have evaluated whether the
agency's interpretation was a permissible statutory construction in
light of Congress' intent, as the Ninth Circuit did in Defenders.234 By
avoiding the Chevron framework, the court failed to address the
overarching issue of whether the failure to list the polar bear as
endangered was an ESA violation.235 Instead, the court reviewed
the individual agency interpretations of "foreseeable," "likely," "sig-
nificant portion of its range," and "distinct population," all absent
229. See generally Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Defense Council, 467
U.S. 837 (1984) (outlining approach to agency decision review).
230. See In re Polar Bear V, 709 F.3d at 15 (describing why challenge to agency's
interpretation "likely" failed); see also U.S. v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 220 (2001)
(holding if Chevron deference not owed, Skidmore may still apply).
231. In re Polar Bear V, 709 F.3d at 15 (acknowledging "foreseeable future" not
defined in statute).
232. Id. at 16 (describing low threshold for upholding agency's interpretation
under State Farm).
233. Final Opposition Brief of Intervenor-Defendants-Appellees, In re Polar
Bear V, 709 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (Nos. 11-5219, 11-5221, 11-5222, 11-5223),
2012 WL 3875177, at *36 (emphasis added) (describing ESA's plain purpose).
234. Cf In re Polar Bear V, 709 F.3d at 7 (declining to use Chevron or analyze
agency's interpretations in relation to Congressional intent), with Defenders (Liz-
ard), 258 F.3d 1136, 1146 (9th Cir. 2001) (relying on Chevron and comparing
agency interpretation to Congressional intent).
235. See In re Polar Bear V, 709 F.3d at 3 (reviewing challenges "narrowly").
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the contextual consideration of the implications of the threatened
versus endangered classifications. 23 6
C. The Special Rule: Contrary To The Purpose of The ESA?
Though the D.C. Circuit applied the factors from State Farn to
the agency's statutory interpretation, the court did not flesh out the
issue of whether the agency "relied on factors which Congress has
not intended it to consider" with respect to the Listing Rule deter-
mination on the whole.2 37 Had the court done so, the analysis
might have resembled the Ninth Circuit's analysis in Defenders,
which demonstrated deference does not take a listing agency off
the hook when it fails to justify its decision between multiple alter-
natives.238 Specifically, the Ninth Circuit in Defenders held the FWS
accountable for failing to apply the "flexible" standard and taking a
more restrictive approach in its determination because it ran con-
trary to Congress' intent in adding the threatened category.239
The court here, however, expressly stated that the agency's
choice only had to be justifiable and articulated, rather than having
to be the interpretation that better adheres to the Act's purpose. 240
While the court's task in reviewing the issue was narrow, it appears
counterintuitive to interpret the "parts" so narrowly that the
"whole" argument is lost. 2 4 1 The FWS chose to list the polar bear as
threatened rather than endangered, which in fact resulted in lesser-
to-no protection for the species, making it an agency action in di-
rect contradiction to the ESA's plain purpose.242
Furthermore, the D.C. Circuit similarly declined to address the
consequences of the agency's Special Rule compared to a standard
ESA listing rule.24 3 Not long after the agency listed the polar bear,
the Bush administration made it clear that greenhouse gas emis-
236. Id. at 7-8 (outlining claims individually and narrowly).
237. Id. at 16 (citation omitted) (applying arbitrary and capricious review).
238. See Defenders (Lizard), 258 F.3d at 1145-46 (finding agency's action arbi-
trary and capricious and remanding proposed rule listing).
239. Id. (observing that Secretary should have employed more "flexible
standard").
240. In re Polar Bear V 709 F.3d at 16 (declining to decide whether agency's
interpretation was best interpretation in light of Congressional intent).
241. Compare In re Polar Bear V, 709 F.3d at 8 (stating narrow scope of review),
with 16 U.S.C. § 1531 (c) (1) (outlining Congressional policy). One of Congress'
ESA policy points was "that all Federal departments and agencies shall seek to
conserve endangered and threatened species and shall utilize their authorities in
furtherance of the purposes of this chapter." 16 U.S.C. § 1531 (c)(1).
242. See Welch, supra note 13, at 680 (describing FWS' interpretation as run-
ning contrary to ESA's purpose).
243. See In re Polar Bear V, 709 F.3d at 18 (neglecting to discuss Special Rule).
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sions would not be regulated as a result of an ESA listing.2 4 4 The
court itself admitted that the main premises on which the FWS
listed the polar bear was that greenhouse gas emissions were caus-
ing Arctic sea ice to melt that polar bears rely on for survival.245
The court did not, however, find issue with the fact that the FWS'
Special Rule listed the animal while simultaneously stating that it
would be provided no protection from the sole cause of its
threat.24 6
The D.C. Circuit's approach is inconsistent with the precedent
set forth by the Supreme Court in Tenn. Valley Auth, which empha-
sized that the ESA's Section Seven "'admits of no exception' and
affords endangered species 'the highest of priorities.' 2 4 7 As Presi-
dent Nixon urged, having protection just for "endangered" species
near extinction "simply [did] not provide the kind of management
tools needed to act early enough to save a vanishing species," the
very notion that spurred the creation of the ESA to offer greater flexi-
bility in offering protection to species at an earlier point in their man-created
demise.248 In contrast to the evaluation of the ribbon seal in
Lubchenco, the D.C. Circuit's opinion does not discuss the unique
aspects of greenhouse gas emissions and the time it would take to
halt global climate change's effects, the delay of which could poten-
tially mean that action needs to be taken now if it will have any
positive impact on the species' ultimate survival.249
The major flaw in this case is the D.C. Circuit's treatment of
the FWS as a neutral, non-political entity to whom deference is
owed.250 The reality is that there are a multitude of political and
personal interests at stake with ESA listings, and it is hard to find a
case that demonstrates this reality better than In re Polar Bear V 25 1
244. See Cummings & Siegel, supra note 10, at 6 (citing Bush administration's
claim that greenhouse gas emission was beyond ESA's scope).
245. In re Polar Bear V, 709 F.3d at 5-6 (describing polar bear's reliance on sea
ice).
246. Id. (failing to discuss Special Rule).
247. See Cummings & Siegel, supra note 10, at 6 (contrasting Tenn. Valley
Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 173-74 (1978), with decision not to regulate green-
house gas emissions through ESA).
248. See McAnaney, supra note 63, at 438 (describing President Nixon's view
on inadequacy of U.S. law to save species early enough).
249. Center for Biological Diversity v. Lubchenco, 758 F. Supp. 2d 945, 969
(N.D. Cal. 2010) (discussing delay of ribbon seal's protection).
250. SeeJudi Brawer, The Endangered Species Act: A Year In Review In the Ninth
Circuit, 50 JUL ADVOCATE 23, 23 (2007) (describing increase in ESA litigation in
Ninth Circuit resulting from industry groups and state and local governments chal-
lenging species' listings and critical habitat designations).
251. See Leppo, supra note 9, at 10582 (stating complexity of In re Polar Bear as
unlikely to be repeated).
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Congress created the Citizen Suit Provision to enable citizens to
provoke agency action; the provision indicates Congress' intent for
courts to be the battleground when agency and private interests
clash under the ESA because Congress' main goal in enacting the
ESA was to protect the future of species and their ecosystems.252
The court's true task should be to ensure - on a case-by-case basis -
that the listing determination is in fact the result of neutral deci-
sionmaking with the at-risk species and the ESA's intent as the pri-
mary consideration.25 3 By relying entirely on due deference to the
FWS and neglecting to consider whether the FWS relied on permis-
sible statutory constructions of the ESA, the D.C. Circuit at the very
least cast doubt as to whether the FWS' interpretations were in ac-
cordance with Congress' intent in creating the threatened species
category and thus for enacting the ESA itself.25 4
VI. IMPACT
The issue at the heart of In re Polar Bear V is two-fold: (1) can
the ESA protect the polar bear from the main threat to its species'
survival and (2) is the ESA the proper mechanism to combat global
climate change. 255 At the conclusion of In re Polar Bear V, eight
years after the initial petition and five years after the polar bear's
listing, the answer to both is a resounding no.256
A. Polar Bears: Slipping Through the Cracks of the ESA
Framework
The FWS' Listing Rule designating the polar bear as an endan-
gered species under the ESA is by no means a victory for the polar
252. See McAnaney, supra note 63, at 442-43 (describing citizen suit provi-
sion's purpose).
253. See Morse, supra note 80, at 567 (describing ESA's purpose).
Id. (quoting President Nixon's request for stronger species protections).
254. See Welch, supra note 13, at 675 (describing D.C. District Court's allow-
ance of FWS to bypass meaningful action to protect polar bear by upholding List-
ing Rule). Specifically, Welch observed that the "interpretation significantly
reduces FWS' responsibility to protect species threatened by climate change, and
runs counter to the purpose of the ESA." Id. at 676.
255. See Secretary Kempthorne Announces, supra note 31 (stating polar bear list-
ing not route to combat greenhouse gas emissions).
256. For a further discussion of the possible effects of In re Polar Bear V, see
infra notes 257-275 and accompanying text.
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bear.2 57 At most, the listing is an empty gesture.258 As former Sec-
retary Dirk Kempthorne emphasized in his decision to list the polar
bear in 2008: "While the legal standards under the ESA compel me
to list the polar bear as threatened, I want to make clear that this
listing will not stop global climate change or prevent any sea ice
from melting."25 9
After achieving a CHD of 187,000 square miles for the polar
bear in 2010, the District Court for the District of Alaska in Alaska
Oil & Gas vacated the CHD in January of 2013.260 Furthermore,
the current ESA recovery plan for the polar bear is nonexistent. 261
Currently, polar bears are "drowning from lack of sea ice, starving
from lack of access to food, and engaging in cannibalism presuma-
bly triggered by food stress." 262 As the USGS observed in Alaska,
one female polar bear recently swam nine days before finally reach-
ing an ice flow 426 miles offshore, losing twenty-two percent of her
body fat and her one-year-old cub during the process.26 Despite
being listed as a threatened species under the ESA five years ago
and being considered the "international icon" for the reality of
global climate change, the polar bear has received virtually no ben-
efit from the attention with regard to its steadily declining
habitat.264
257. See Welch, supra note 13, at 675 (citing Richard B. Alley et al., Summary
for Policymakers, in INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE
CHANGE 2007: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS 2-4 (Susan Solomon et al. eds., 2007)),
available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/wgl/ar4-wgl-spm.
pdf) (describing imminent "point of no return" for saving polar bear species).
258. See id. (noting D.C. District Court allowed FWS to bypass meaningful ac-
tion to protect polar bear by upholding Listing Rule).
259. Secretary Kempthorne Announces, supra note 31 (describing limited scope of
polar bear's listing).
260. Alaska Oil and Gas Ass'n v. Salazar, 916 F. Supp. 2d 974, 1001-02 (D.
Alaska 2013) (outlining court's holding); see also Endangered Species Act Profile, CTR.
FOR BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY, http://www.biologicaldiversity.org/species/mammals/
polar.bear/endangered-species-act.profile.html (last visited Oct. 21, 2013)
(describing lack of CHD for polar bear under ESA).
261. See Recovery Plans By Species, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., http://ecos.fws.
gov/tess.public/pub/speciesRecovery.jsp?sort=1 (last visited Oct. 23, 2013) (list-
ing plans and details for listed species and populations); see also Endangered Species
Act Profile, supra note 260 (outlining current ESA profile of polar bear).
262. See Cummings & Siegel, supra note 10, at 7 (describing polar bear's pre-
sent condition).
263. See Armstrong, supra note 105, at 446-47 (quoting Kim Murphy, Polar
Bear's Long Swim Illustrates Ice Melt, L.A. TIMES (an. 29, 2011), http://articles.la-
times.com/2011/jan/29/nation/la-na-polar-bears-20110129) (noting one polar
bear's plight as result of declining sea ice).
264. See ON THIN ICE, supra note 4, at 2 (describing lack of benefit to polar
bear despite attention).
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B. Global Warming Continues On
Global climate change's unique nature presents a new and dif-
ficult threat for animal species threatened by its effects, as is
demonstrated after the outcome of In re Polar Bear V
Unfortunately, by the time a species is 'endangered,' any
regulation of greenhouse emissions as a result of the 'en-
dangered' status would not save that species, because cli-
mate change would persist decades or even centuries
beyond the date of regulation. 265
In light of the present lack of "clear causal connections be-
tween greenhouse gas emissions," its sources, the ability to halt or
reverse the effects, and the uncertainty of how long that would or
could take, the ESA will not be able to stand up to the task simply
by listing species threatened by global climate change until it is too
late. 266
The ribbon seal's plight in Lubchenco is a prime example of In
re Polar Bear Vs impact on ESA use for animal species affected by
global climate change.267 In Lubchenco, the court pointed to the
FWS' determination in In re Polar Bear Vof the "foreseeable future"
as forty-five years to find that the NMFS's rejection of the ribbon
seal was consistent with the polar bear decision.268 Beyond 2050,
the NMFS found that "enormous uncertainty about future social
and political decisions on emissions" will affect projection of condi-
tions after that point.269 Thus, the FWS' polar bear listing will act as
a bar for protection to animal species even in the same threatened
habitat, particularly because the listing left the issue of greenhouse
gas emissions unchanged.270 Absent a clearer standard for what
265. See Armstrong, supra note 105, at 448 (describing ESA's failure for only
being effective when its too late).
266. Id. at 448 (discussing why ESA fails to address global climate change).
267. Center for Biological Diversity v. Lubchenco, 758 F. Supp. 2d 945, 967
(N.D. Cal. 2010) (citing In re Polar Bear V in analysis).
268. Id. at 962-63 (comparing FWS definition of foreseeable future in In re
Polar Bear V with NMFS's definition for ribbon seal).
269. Id. (restating NMFS's reasoning for not extending projection beyond
2050).
270. Cf Alaska v. Lubchenco, 825 F. Supp. 2d 209, 211 (D.D.C. 2011) (find-
ing agency listing of beluga whales in Alaska Cook inlet as endangered was ra-
tional), with In re Polar Bear III, 794 F. Supp. 2d 65, 89-90 (D.D.C. 2011) (finding
agency did not act arbitrarily and capriciously in listing polar bear as threatened)
and Lubchenco, 758 F. Supp. 2d at 945 (finding agency did not act arbitrarily and
capriciously by declining to list ribbon seal as threatened or endangered). In
Alaska v. Lubchenco, the District Court for the District of Columbia dealt with the
regulation and effects of subsistence hunting on the DPS, rather than dealing with
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constitutes foreseeable, the case-by-case approach allows the FWS to
avoid addressing the very real, but unfortunately political, impact of
global climate change on Arctic species.271
By contrast, when an agency lists an animal whose primary
threat is unrelated to global climate change, the ESA listing process
remains the same and both agencies and courts are less reluctant to
offer the full extent of protection under the ESA. 2 7 2 Many other
species stand to be affected by global climate change and are cur-
rently not afforded any protection under the ESA, including the
American pika, coral reef, and Pacific walrus species.273 While the
ESA's purpose does not explicitly include combatting global cli-
mate change and regulating greenhouse gas emissions, if no other
regulatory mechanisms are put in place, the time will inevitably
come when the ESA will be forced to tackle the issue in light of the
direct harm to, and extinction of, various species. 274 Should the
extinction of the polar bear occur first, the outright failure of the
ESA may call for a complete reworking of the statutory framework;
only time will tell.2 7 5
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the uncertainty of greenhouse gas emissions and global climate change. Alaska,
825 F. Supp. 2d at 211.
271. See Lubchenco, 758 F. Supp. 2d at 945 (relying on In re Polar Bear V in
analysis).
272. See Alaska, 825 F. Supp. 2d at 211 (finding agency listing of beluga whales
in Alaska Cook inlet as endangered was rational).
273. SeeJ.B. Ruhl, Climate Change and the Endangered Species Act: Building Bridges
to the No-Analog Future, SR021 ALI-ABA 203, 205 (2009) (describing threat to Amer-
ican pika); Rod Downie, Declining Arctic Sea Ice Forces Thousands of Walrus Ashore,
HUFFINGTON PosT (Sept. 19, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/rod-dow-
nie/arctic-seab_3953420.html (describing thousands of Pacific walruses washing
up on shore in Alaska in light of sea ice decline); Armstrong, supra note 105, at
429-432 (describing threat to coral reefs as result of global climate change).
274. See Welch, supra note 13, at 682 (describing future implications of In re
Polar Bear in light of other species climate change threatens).
275. See Liebesman, supra note 61, at 235 (addressing status of ESA climate
change litigation).
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